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ABSTRACT

Terrorism -- A New Threat for Indonesia?
AN ANALYSIS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF INDONESIA IN THE
POST-SUHARTO PERIOD

By

LAU Wun Yin Wilson

Master of Philosophy

Indonesia is the fourth most heavily populated nation in the world with over 210
million inhabitants. Almost half of all Southeast Asians live in Indonesia, and it is
also the world’s most populated Muslim nation. These features make it a crucial
country in the Southeast Asian Region, as well as in the world. Therefore, the
national security of this country is very important to the region and the world.
Security or national security covers dealing with the threat(s) to the state, so, in
order to study this issue, we need to identify what kind of threat is behind the
scenario.
Indonesia ’s post-independence political history has been dominated by two long
serving presidents. During Sukarno’s period (1949-1965), external or conventional
military threats ranked the highest priority in the agenda of national security; but
after the fall of Sukarno in 1965, under Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998), the focus
was changed to internal threats, such as secessionist movements, religious conflicts,
radicalism and so on. The security goals of the New Order government were to
maintain sovereignty, unity, integrity and stability though economic development and
military suppression. However, in May 1998, anti-government demonstrations
(Reformasi Movement) make Suharto step down. Within 2 years, the presidency of

Indonesia changed 3 times, from Suharto to Habibie; from Habibie to Wahid; and
from Wahid to Megawati. In addition, after the September 11 th incident, the whole
international environment has changed as well. Therefore, is there any change to the
national security parameters of Indonesia in such a new era?
The purpose to this research project is to find out what has happened to
Indonesian national security priorities in the post-Suharto period. To a certain extent,
the security goals of those post-Suharto governments are almost the same as during
the Suharto period---maintaining national unity and integrity plus restoring
Indonesia’s international creditability, in order to achieve a stable country. However,
after the September 11 th incident, the world has been pushed on to a “war on terror”
led by United States, and the explosion on the island of Bali in October 2002 have
suddenly put Southeast Asia on the frontline of the “war on terror” and heightened
concerns about the threat of terrorism to Indonesia ’s national security and its national
credibility. Therefore, will terrorism become a new threat to Indonesia? How deep is
the impact that terrorist activities can make on Indonesia?
In order to answer the above questions, this thesis will be focusing on three
aspects; firstly, how terrorism intensifies the pre-existing internal security threats of
Indonesia. Secondly, the emergence of ‘new terrorism’ in the contemporary
Indonesian political economy. Thirdly, the limitations on or difficulties for the
Indonesia n government in tackling terrorism.

I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and I
warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been
duly acknowledged.

LAU Wun-yin, Wilson
November 2004
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Chapter 1

Chapter One
Introduction

What is a New Era? The beginning of a new millennium, the successful
mapping of the human genome or the development of the Internet across the world?
Many people might have thought that those events represent the beginning of a new
era, at least until the day of September 11th 2001. It will be remembered as a
defining moment in world history. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in
New York, and the Pentagon in Washington on that day, shocked not just the United
States but the entire world. The attacks are a watershed, with far-reaching
implications for future security. They demonstrated that even the world’s sole
superpower, historically protected by two vast oceans, is no longer immune from the
new weapons of terror. Terrorism thus became a global phenomenon and problem,
not only affecting the diplomatic policy of United States but also the global order,
because the world has been pushed on to a “war on terror” led by the United States.

As we are all living in such a new era, I think more should be known on
terrorism. This reason provides me with a great interest in conducting research about
terrorism. In doing a literature review, I found that most of the research on terrorism
was based on the Western or the Middle Eas t countries; only a little touched on
South-east Asia, one of the most diverse and complicated regions in the world.
Moreover, the explosion on the island of Bali at October 2002 ha s suddenly put
South-east Asia on the frontline of the “war on terror ” and heightened concerns about
the threat of terrorism to Indonesia ’s national security and its national credibility.
Therefore, I would like to conduct research on terrorism based in Indonesia.
1
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Background on Indonesia

Indonesia is the fourth most heavily populated nation in the world with over 210
million inhabitants. Almost half of all Southeast Asians live in Indonesia, and it is
also the world’s most populated Muslim nation. These features make it a crucial
country in the Southeast Asian Region, as well as in the world. Therefore, the
national security of this country is very important to the region and the world.

Indonesia ’s post-independence political history has been dominated by two long
serving presidents. During Sukarno’s period (1949-1965), external or conventional
military threats ranked the highest priority in the agenda of national security; but
after the fall of Sukarno in 1965, under Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998), the focus
was changed to internal threats, such as secessionist movements, religious conflicts,
radicalism and so on. The security goals of the New Order government were to
maintain sovereignty, unity, integrity and stability though economic development and
military suppression. However, on 20th May 1998, ten days of student-led
anti-government demonstrations (Reformasi Movement) make Suharto step down.
Within 2 years, the presidency of Indonesia changed 3 times, from Suharto to
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie; from Habibie to K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid; and from
Wahid to Megawati Sukarnoputri. Indonesia is now undergoing first direct
presidential election which may result in yet another new president. In addition, after
the September 11th incident, the whole international environment has changed as well.
Therefore, is there any change to the national security parameters of Indonesia in
such a new era?

2
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Objective

There are altogether three objectives of this thesis: First, try to examine the
national security of Indonesia. Second, try to examine the influence/impact of
terrorism on the national security. Third, try to examine whether the nature of
terrorism in Indonesia is changing.

Research Questions

With the above objectives, four research questions will be set out in this thesis,
and they are:

1)

What is the nature of the security threats in Indonesia?

2)

Did the nature of the security threats change due to the changes in the
political environment?

3)

To what extent did terrorism already exist in Indonesia and what is the
nature of the current terrorism?

4)

What are the limitations on or difficulties for the Indonesian government in
tackling the security threats and terrorism?

Literature Review

Since Indonesia is a crucial country in the Southeast Asian region as well as in
the world, the national security of this country is an important and interesting topic
for the scholars to study.

3
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Dewi Fortuna Anwar (1998) produced a comprehensive structure in examing
the issue of national security of Indonesia by suggesting that there are different
perspectives on the security threats by different presidents. According to Anwar,
Sukarno believed that Indonesia’s independence and national unity were directly
threatened by foreign powers in particular by the former colonial and imperialistic
states. Such a world -view made him focus on the external threats that will affect the
stability of the country. However, Suharto saw the most immediate threat was come
from the country itself. Anwar interpreted Suharto’s view on the issue of national
security as “fundamental insecurity stems from the fact that it is a newly inde pendent
county with a highly heterogeneous population, most of whom are still poor and
barely educated, living in an equally fragmented territory” (Anwar, 1998, p.478).
With such a perspective, Suharto took an inward-looking security strategy in dealing
with the national security issue of Indonesia. Anwar had identified three threats that
Indonesia was facing during the New Order’s administration: they were the
ideological threats from Communism and Islam, the secessionist threat and
democratic threat. In dealing with these threats. She suggested that Suharto had been
practiced management of ideological conformity, tight sociopolitical control of
society and economic development. Finally, Anwar made a comment on the New
Order’s approaches to national security in that way, “Although this strategy may give
the government a sense of security in the short term, it will undoubtedly el ad to
instability in the long term, because the people will not tolerate forever all the rules
and limitations that govern their lives in the name of stability and development”
(Anwar, 1998, p.512). This suggestion, in fact, acts as a good starting point in
exploring the national security issues of Indonesia, because Anwar’s works only
covered the period from Sukarno to Suharto.

4
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Ange l Rabasa and Peter Chalk’s book (2001) made further contributions to the
issue of national security in Indonesia by extending the study in the post-Suharto
period. In addition, they have done a more detail and in depth study on the
secessionist threats in Aceh, Irian Jaya and East Timor. They have suggested the
roots of the secessionist threats, for example, the transmigration policy practiced by
the central government, the strong ethnic identity of these areas and the economic
exploitation by Jakarta. Besides, they have pointed out that the factor of TNI was in
fact the most crucial factor in the secessionist threat. Rabasa and Chalk did make an
interesting statement on it by stated that, “economic exploitation would probably not
have been strong enough to generate overt separatist sentiments. For much of the
1980s, GAM experienced relatively little popular support, with most Acehnese
merely calling for more autonomy and control over natural resources. It was only
during the last decade that these sentiments began to change, largely as a result of
anger generated by military excesses… such excesses engendered increased support
for GAM and its violent separatist agenda.” (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.33)
Moreover, Rabasa and Chalk also provided much information and facts on the
secessionist movements, they have mentioned that the operational tactic for GAM
was mostly concentrated on hit-and-run attacks at first, however the overall scale of
violence have been increased since 1999. The operational focus of GAM has been
extend to Javanese migrants, suspected Indonesian sympathizers and perceived
symbols of Javanese domination.

There are also works done in this aspect by other academics and organizations,
such as Rabasa and John Haseman (2002) and the reports made by Human Rights
Watch. These works also provide details on the secessionist movements in Indonesia,
together with some analysis and recommendation behind the scenario. For example,
5
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Rabasa and Haseman suggested that the inconsistent approach of conciliation and
repression in dealing with the secessionist movements by the post-Suharto
governments was a failure.

Tim Huxley (2002) and Vivienne Wee (2002) produced more comprehensive
works on the study of national security in Indonesia by clearly stating out the two
threats that were most serious to the national security of this country: the secessionist
movements and the ideological challenge from Islam. They both emphasis in
pointing out that the threats will lead to the fragmentation of the country. However,
Wee stated that the idea on the fragmentation of the country arises from primordial
was ethnic sentiments (secessionist movements) was a wrong interpretation. “While
there are dozens of major ethnic groups and hundreds of minor ones in Indonesia,
there are not correspondingly dozens or hundreds of separatists movements… this
indicates that ethnicity, in and of itself, does not necessarily generate
ethno-nationalism” (Wee, 2002, p.3). In fact, the ideological conflicts between
secularism and Islamic act as the driving force in generate ethno-nationalism. Huxley
also have the similar view as Wee, but he presented the ideological challenge from
Islam as communal conflicts, and stated that “communal conflict has been much
more widespread than armed separatism, and together with growing religious
extremism may undermine national cohesion more seriously in the long term”
(Huxley, 2002, p.57). Once recognizing the security threats in Indonesia under the
post-Suharto period, they go into depth in examining the threats. Wee has pointed out
that the factors behind the threats were due to the uncertainty on the nature of state.
Just as what she mentioned in her article, “Is Indonesia the ‘heir’ of the Durch East
Indies?” or a “brand-new nation-state, which has liberated itself completely from the
Dutch?” (Wee, 2002, p.7) Besides, she also pointed out that “the transmigration
6
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programme has generated much resentment among indigenous host populations.”
(Wee, 2002, p.11) which act as fundamental factor to the security threats that
Indonesia is facing with nowadays. Wee (2002) even produced a historical
comparative study on the ethnic and ideological conflicts in Indonesia , starting from
1945 to present, which may served as a background for the further on study. While
Huxley focus on the military factor which will act as the major reason behind the
security threats, because the military see the unstavle and violence situation as a
‘project’ for them to gain more in the political arena. A variety of the academic works
on the study of national security of Indonesia in the post-Suharto period are not so
systematic, with just emphases on certain specific aspects or areas, for example, the
secessionist threats (Colombijn and Lindblad 2002, Lee 1999), the ideological
challenge by Islam (Abuza 2003, Azra 2003, Porter 2002, Jamhari 1999, Rais, 1999),
the military factor in the security threats (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, Rasaba and
Chalk 2001, Vatikiots 1993), the change in the political environment after the fall of
Suharto (R icklefs 2001, Schwarz and Paris 1999, Vatikiots 1998). However, even
though the works of Huxley and Wee have included almost all of the above, aspects
or areas as mentioned, they still left out one aspect, that is the influence of terrorism.
Although, Huxley’s work (2002) covered the influence of the international on the
national security of Indonesia, it just focused on the situation after the September 11
incident and not in a comprehensive way.

It seems that there is an academic poverty in this area, which induced me to do
some literature review on the aspect of terrorism.

To date, works on terrorism are numerous (such as Comb 2002, Laqueur, 2001,
Whittaker 2001, Hoffman 1998). Basically, these works try to conceptualize the
7
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meaning of terrorism, the features of terrorism or the motivations behind it. (this will
be discussed in more details in the conceptualization). Bruce Hoffman (1998) has
made a distinction between “traditional” terrorism and New Terrorism, which served
as a breakthrough in the study of terrorism. It is because he was the first one who
have systematically modified the meaning of terrorism with the change in the world
context and clearly stated out some difference between the “traditional” one and the
“New” one (refer to conceptualization for more details). However, most of these
academic works seldom use Asia or Southeast Asia region as an example. Much of
them were focused on the cases in Middle East or the Western countries. F or
example, in David Whittaker’s book (2001), twelve case studies on terrorism were
listed out in the book, but not one of them is a country in Asia. For other literatures
on this aspect (Henderson 2001, Laquer 2001, Hoffman, 1998), they also seldom use
the countries in Asia or Southeast Asian region as examples for illustrating the
concept of terrorism. That means, there is a lack of application of the study on
terrorism to the Asia and Southeast Asia region.

Only until recently, seldom academic works have began to apply the study of
terrorism together with the national security issues of the countries in Southeast Asia.

Daljit Singh (2002) stated that the main reason behind the growth of terrorism in
Indonesia was due to the change in the political environment after the fall of Suharto,
in which, Muslim political forces have been able to organize and propagate important
factor in the domestic politics of Indonesia. T his will act as a pressure or constraints
to the Jakarta in tackling the suspected terrorist group with Islamic background, such
as Jemaah Islamiah (JI). He stated that “Islam will remain on important force,
making it difficult for political leaders to act firmly” (Singh,2002, p.7).
8
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Rabasa and Haseman (2002) go along with this view by stating that in response
to the challenge of Islamic terrorists and radicals, Megawati’s government showed
caution and hesitancy. They further explain this view by saying that “Megawati and
her advisors see great political risks and few advantages in moving against the
radicals, even if this frustrates the U.S. and some of Indonesia’s neighbors” (Rabasa
and Haseman, 2002, p.89). Beside the Islamic factor, they have also suggested that
the infiltration and operating of the international terrorist groups (networks) in
Indonesia will act as a factor to induce the growth of terrorist sentiment. It will be
relatively easy for the international terrorist groups to infiltrate and influence the
domestic radical organization since many of these groups share the same ideological
orientation and biases.

Rohan K. Gunaratna (2003) does make a contribution in illustrating how
Al-Qaeda began infiltrating into Indonesia from the late 1980s, making Indonesia
become a terrorists training base. In fact, Gunaratna’s work provides information to
support the views from Rabasa and Haseman. In addition, he had also mentioned
some features of the terrorism nowadays, for example, terrorists have shifted their
attention from hard targets (military targets) to soft targets (economic and
commercial targets); and most of their training is political and ideological training,
the military training just completed within a short period of time at the last stage.
However, they are not presented in a systematic way and not in detail.

Andrew Tan (2003) perhaps has done the most comprehensive, systematic and
organized work on this aspect. He bring along the concept on “traditional” terrorism
and New Terrorism from Hoffman (1998) together with the national security issue in
the Southeast Asia region, especially on Indonesia. However, the lack of a close fit
9
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between nation and state, in which, a legacy came from the colonial period was the
main cause for the growth of terrorism in Southeast Asian as well as Indonesia. He
thinks that the lack of political legitimacy has been a major cause for the armed
rebellions that have taken place in some countries in Southeast Asia.

Actually, the above works have thrown light on exploring the inter -relationship
between terrorism and the national security of Indonesia. However, they are all more
descriptive than theoretical, so, a study on this aspect with theoretical support and
guiding is urgently needed. My thesis attempts to make use of the conflict cycle
model as a theoretical framework in examine the inter-relationships between
terrorism and national security in Indonesia, hopefully, to throw new light on the
inspirations of this aspect.

Conceptualization

There are two crucial terms that need to conceptualize in this thesis first prior to
the further discussion. They are “Terrorism” and National Security.

Terrorism
Terrorism is a term that most people must have a vague idea or impression of
what it is, especially after the September 11th incident. There are many definitions of
the term “terrorism”, such as,

‘The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance
of political or social objectives ’(FBI).
10
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‘The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are
generally political, religious or ideological’ (US Department of Defense).

‘The use of threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological
cause, of action which involves serious violence against any person or property’ (UK
government).

‘A strategy of violence designed to promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the
public at large’ (Walter Reich).

‘The use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change ’ (Brian
Jenkins).

An influential definition on terrorism was given by Walter Laqueur as ‘the use
of covert violence by a group for political ends, usually directed against a
government, less frequently against another group, class or party. The ends may va ry
from the redress of “grievances”, to the overthrow of a government and the taking
over of power, or to the liberation of a country from foreign rule. Terrorists seek to
cause political, social and economic disruption, and for this purpose frequently
engage in planned or indiscriminate murder.’

Although there are many definitions on the term terrorism, we still lack a more
precise, concrete and truly explanatory definition of this word. There are basically
three reasons why terrorism is so difficult to define.

11
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First of all, the meaning of the term has changed so frequently since the end of
the Second World War. At that time, the term was used primarily in reference to the
violent

revolts

then

being

prosecuted

by

the

various

indigenous

nationalists/anti-colonialist groups that emerged in Asia, Africa and the Middle East
during the late 1940s and 1950s, to oppose continued European rule (Hoffman, 1998,
pp.15-28).

Later on, during the late 1960s and 1970s, terrorism continued to be viewed in a
revolutionary context, but was expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist
groups outside a colonial or neo-colonial framework as well as radical, entirely
ideologically -motivated organizations. (Whittaker, 2001, pp4-6)

During recent years, terrorism has been used to denote broader, less distinct
phenomena, for example , in the 1980s, the term came to be regarded as a calculated
means to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy. By the middle of
the decade, terrorism became associated with a type of covert or surrogate warfare
whereby weaker states could confront larger, more powerful rivals without the risk of
retribution (Hoffman, 1998, pp.15-28).

The frequent shifts in the meaning of terrorism has induced a second difficulty,
namely the question of subjectivity. As Brian Jenkins stated,“(Terrorism) thus seems
to depend on one’s point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; and if
one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has
directly persua ded others to adopt its moral viewpoint.” (Whittaker, 2001, p8)
Another example come s from the address of Yassir Arafat, the chairman of Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) in the UN General Assembly in November 1974,
12
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which stated that, “The difference between revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the
reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the
freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists,
cannot possibly be called terr orists.” (Whittaker, 2001, p8) Hence it seems that the
decision to call someone or label some organization “terrorist” becomes almost
unavoidably subjective.

The third problem is that the term “Terrorism” has been overused by the mass
media, which labels of a range of violent acts as “terrorism”, thus making confusing
guerrilla warfare, ordinary criminal events as well as lunatic assassin. Hoffman has
distinguished the difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare; and the
difference between terrorism and ordinary criminal events as well as lunatic assassin.

First of all, although guerrillas often employ the same tactics for the same
purpose as terrorist did; guerrilla warfare is taken refer to a numerically larger group
of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces,
and seize and hold territory; while terrorists do not function in open as armed units,
make no attempt to seize or hold territory, and rarely exercise any direct control or
sovereignty over either territory or population (Hoffman, 1998, pp.41-44).

In addition, terrorism is different from civil war, too. According to the Oxford
Concise Dictionary of Politics, war means “armed conflict between two or more
parties, usually fought for political ends.” Although it is quite similar to terrorism,
the difference is on the scale. For war, it involved with the use of force between large
scale political units, such as state or empires; while the scale of terrorist group(s) is
not as large as the state. Moreover, for war, it usually concerns the control of territory
13
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and ultimately the government structure while terrorists acts seldom have such an
aim in mind.

Secondly, although both the ordinary criminals and the terrorists use violence as
a means to attaining a specific end; while the violent act itself may be similar, the
purpose or the motivation clearly is not. For ordinary criminals, the goals are purely
egocentric, they use violence as a means to obtain money or to acquire material
goods. They are acting primarily for selfish, personal motivations. However,
terrorism, is intended to create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself, and
the fundamental aim of the terrorist’s violence is “altruistic”. Terrorists want to
change “the system”. They believe that they are serving a “good” cause designed to
achieve a greater good for a wider constituency, whether real or imagined. As Konrad
Kellen observes, “Terrorist without a cause(at least in his own mind), is not a
terrorist” (Whittaker, 2001, pp.8-9). In addition, the ordinary criminal’s violent act do
not convey with “message” to anyone other than the victim itself. That means the
violent act is not designed or intended to have conquences or create psychological
repercussions beyond the act itself which is different from terrorism.

Thirdly, for the difference between lunatic assassin and terrorism is on the
purpose. The goal for the lunatic assassin is more often intrinsically idiosyncratic,
completely egocentric and deeply personal; whereas goal for terrorist is much more
“political” (Hoffman, 1998, pp.41-43).

It is clear that defining the term “terrorism” will not be easy due to the above
reasons. However, in order to complete this thesis, a definition of “terrorism” must
be worked out or conceptualized. In fact, some elements can be derived from the
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analysis of the differences among terrorism and guerrilla warfare, ordinary criminal
events and lunatic assassin, which will help to contribute to a more objective
definition of “terrorism”. The elements are as follows.

Terrorism:

l

has ineluctably political aims and motives;

l

is a violent or, equally important, threatens violence;

l

is designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the
immediate victim or target;

l

is conducted by an organiza tion with an identifiable chain of command or
conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying
insignia);

l

is perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.

l

Attacks both military and civilians, often seeing the latter as “soft targets”.
(Source: Hoffman, 1998 p43)

So, based on these elements, Hoffman has defined “terrorism ” as “the deliberate
creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the
pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of
violence.” He further elaborates the term by saying that “Terrorism is specifically
designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim or
object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate,
a wider “target audience” that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an
entire country, a national government or a political party, or public opinion in
general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate
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power where there is very little.” (Hoffman, 1998, pp.41-44) through the publicity
generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and
power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an
international scale.

However, in order to simplify the definition for the purpose of this thesis, I
would like to combine two points from Hoffman’s definition together with the
description from Cindy C. Combs. She defined “terrorism” as,

‘An act comprised of at least four crucial elements: 1) it is an act of violence; 2) it
has a political motive or goal; 3) it is perpetrated against innocent persons; and 4) it
is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the
desired result.’(Combs, 1997)

To these four points I would add Hoffman ‘s final two points, namely that the
act should be conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or
cell structure and that it should be carried out by a subnational or non-state entity.

Moreover, for those states that are using terrorist acts against the innocent
people outside their country, for example, Libya, would be just defined as
state-sponsed terrorism but not state terrorism.

Therefore, the term “terrorism” in this thesis will be defined as--An act
comprised of at least six crucial elements: 1) it is an act of violence; 2) it has a
political motive or goal; 3) it is perpetrated against innocent persons; and 4) it is
staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the
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desired result.’5) it should be conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain
of command or cell structure; and 6) it should be carried out by a subnational or
non-state entity.

In addition, as derived by Hoffman, the mechanism of terrorism is “Through the
publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence
and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an
international scale” (Hoffman, 1998, p.44)

This thesis will not be concerned with so called “State Terrorism” because it a
rather mis-leading concept.

State terrorism was defined as “acts of terrorism which a state commits against
defenseless victims, rather than from terror -violence by a lone assassin or small,
fanatic, non-state group” (Comb 2002, p.24). However, according to Max Weber, the
state is a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 1988); in other
words, the state is considered as the sole source of the ‘right’ to use violence. It
seems that there is a contradiction between the definition of state and the concept of
state terrorism.

Moreover, for those states that are using terrorist acts against the innocent
citizen outside their country, for example, Libya can be just defined as
state-sponsored terrorism but not state terrorism.

Therefore, I would say that State terrorism is a mis -leading concept subject to
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the definition of the state by Weber. So, this thesis will be focused on a more narrow
definition of terrorism with non-state actor(s) as mentioned in the previous
paragraphs.

After conceptualizing the term “terrorism”, two types of terrorism, which are
“traditional” terrorism and New Terrorism will be included in this thesis.

“Traditional” Terrorism and “New” Terrorism

In order to utilise the term New Terrorism, the term “traditional” terrorism
should be explained first. According to Bruce Hoffman, traditional terrorism was
formed during the Cold War; it had a clear set of political objectives. The groups who
conducted the “traditional” terrorism were those radical left-wing groups, such as the
Japanese Red Army Faction, as well as other nationalist-type groups such as the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) and the PLO. These groups were mostly characterized by
their tight organization and hierarchical structure, consisting of individuals engaged
in conspiracy as a full-time occupation. These groups often issued communiqués
taking credit for and explaining their actions (Hoffman, 1997, p.2).

In contrast to the “traditional” terrorism, those groups who adopted new terrorism
have less comprehensible nationalistic or ideological motivations, embracing much
more amorphous religious and millenarian aims; moreover, they are also less
cohesive in their organization, with a more diffuse structure and membership. More
important is that those groups who have adopted new terrorism as the strategy
usually see violence as an end in itself, not just a means to an end (Hoffman, 1997,
pp.8-9). They attempt mass casualty terrorist acts, which try to kill a large number of
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people, by using both conventional explosives or weapons of mass destruction (Tan,
2003, p.87) and try to create a spectacle before the audience in which they hope for a
reaction of fear and terror as the desired goal. So it is obvious that the lethality of the
New Terrorism has been increasing. Hoffman has suggested three reasons in
explaining such a phenomenon.

First, it was due to the growth in the number of terrorist groups motivated by a
religious imperative. Religion can fulfill the function of a legitimizing force, which
can justify the action that they are undertaking. (more will be discussed in chapter
six)

Second, is due to the proliferation of “amateurs” involved in terrorist acts. Due to
the improvements in science and technology, the means and methods of terrorism
have become “accessible to anyone with a grievance” (Hoffman, 1998, p.4). In
contrast to the terrorists in “traditional” terrorism, the terrorists now can obtain the
necessary capability more easily. Thus, more people can be involved in terrorism
since they have both the motivation and the capability in doing that.

Third, is due to the increasing sophist ication and operational competence of
“professional” terrorists. The new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors,
becoming smarter, tougher and more difficult to capture or eliminate. Rather like the
Darwinian principle of natural selection (Hoffman, 1998, p.7).

Beside the increase in lethality, another feature of New Terrorism is that there is
less frequently any claiming credit for the attacks by the terrorist group. They tend
not to take responsibility and much less issue communiqués explaining why they
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carried out an attack in the way that “traditional” terrorist groups of the past did
(Hoffman, 1998).

The above features for New Terrorism derive from another feature, that is
“violence for some terrorist group is becoming less a means to an end than an end
itself that does not require any wider explanation or justification beyond the group’s
members themselves and perhaps their specific followers” (Hoffman, 1998, p.8). It
may be due to the function of religion or it may be that the terrorists even cannot find
out a reason for the violent acts.

Hoffman concludes that New Terrorism has “become more complex, amorphous
and transnational. The distinction between domestic and international terrorism is
also evaporating” (Hoffman, 1998, p.10).

National Security

National security is a diverse and complicated topic. Scholars have various
definitions on it. F or example Penelope Hartland-Thunberg defines national security
as the ability of a nation to pursue successfully its national interests, as it sees them,
any place in the world; Michael H.H. Louw sees national security as the non-military
actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to
exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objec tives; and the
National Defense College (Canada) defines the term as the preservation of a way of
life acceptable to the … people and compatible with the needs and legitimate
aspirations of others (Buzan, 1991 pp.16-17).
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However, if we want to have a more comprehensive and accurate picture, one
way is to analyse both words “National” (State) and “Security” individually.

According to Barry Buzan, “State” is comprised of three components; they are
“Idea of State”, “The Physical Base of the State” and “The Institution of the State”
(Buzan, 1991 p.65). The Idea of State means what binds the people into a
socio-political and territorial entity, the two main sources are to be found in the
nation and in organizing ideologies. The Physical Base of the State comprises it
population and territory, including all of the natural resources and man-made wealth
contained within its borders. The Institutions of the state comprise the entire
machinery of government, including its executive, legislative, administrative and
judicial bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate

The term “Security”, according to John E. Mroz, means the relative freedom
from harmful threats (Mroz, 1980 p.105).

Therefore, the term “National Security” in this research will be define d as
preventing or lessening harmful threats to the three components of the state.

Theoretical Framework

The Conflict Cycle model will be used as the theoretical framework for this
thesis. According to Louis Kriesberg, a conflict or a social conflict exists when two
or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives
(Kriesberg, 1998 p.2). Two words should be clarified at this stage, the first is
“manifest”, which means that significant members of at least one of the contending
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groups exhibits the belief that some of its goals are incompatible with those of
another party; this is indicated by attacking the other party, by proclaiming that an
adversary must change, or by arousing and mobilizing other members of the group
for the struggle. The second word is “incompatible objectives” which means that the
realization of some of their goals are thwarted by another party and therefore requires
that party to change the ways it resists. Those pre-existing threats to Indonesia are
exactly a kind of social conflict or conflict in these terms. The separatist movements
in Aceh and Irian Jaya , and the Indonesian government, act as adversaries. Each side
has incompatible objectives which compels the other side to change. The above
framework also applies to the ideological conflict in Indonesia, in which the
secularist and the radical Muslim act as the adversaries.

The Conflict Cycle is used to illustrate different stages of a conflict, how it
emerges, escalates, de-escalates and is settled. There are altogether six stages for a
conflict cycle, which are: 1) Bases; 2) Manifestation; 3) Escalation; 4)
De -escalation; 5) Termination; 6) Consequences (see figure 1.1). The pre-existing
threats which have been mentioned before can be illustrated by this cycle, since they
are a kind of conflict. Below is a brief explanations to each stage,

1) Base: The underlying conditions that can become the sources for an overt
struggle.
2) Manifestation: Four components must be present for this to occur. First, at least
one protagonist has a sense of its identity, distinguishing itself from other parties.
Second, members of one or more of the adversary parties believe that they have a
grievance, some aspect of their situation being unsatisfactory and unjustified.
Third, members of one or more sides, believing that their grievance would be
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reduced by a change wrought by another person or group, formulate a goal to
bring about the changes in the other side so that the grievance will be reduced.
Fourth, those asserting the goal must believe that they can act to help attain it.
The conflict has become manifest as one or both sides express these beliefs by
mobilizing supporters or by directly trying to affect the opposing side so as to
achieve their goal.
3) Escalation: Opposition becomes manifest and each side attempts to attain its
goal, increasing its efforts by intensifying the means used and rallying support for
its cause. Terrorism is a strategy for the adversaries at this stage and terrorist
activities such as bombing, mass killing and kidnapping are the tactics in
achieving the strategy.
4) De-escalation: It arises from changes in the relationship between adversaries,
from changes within one of the major adversaries, and from changes in the
external context.
5) Termination: The end of a conflict.
6) Consequences: The outcome of a conflict.
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Consequences
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Fig 1.1

Conflict Cycle
(Source: Kriesberg, 1998)
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So, for this thesis, we will be focusing on how and why terrorism is chosen as
anti-government strategy. Actually, each contending party adopts a strategy or a set
of strategies to attain its goals. There are a lot of alternatives in conflict strategies
which can be explained in terms of the inducements. According to Louis Kriesberg,
three basic inducements are generally recognized: coercion, reward and persuasion.
Terrorism is recognize d as a highly coercive inducement strategy. It is generally
regarded as the violation of fundamental rules of conflict behaviour, so it has a low
degree of regulation and institutionalization; therefore it can help in explaining that
why terrorism to some group is just but to another is immoral. It is because such a
low degree of regulation and institutionalization will make the adversaries of the two
sides in the conflict disagree with the modes or strategies that is being used. Since
there are no external rules or regulations that govern the contending parties in the
conflict.

Different types of inducement and differences in degree of regulation and
institutionalization generate different conflict strategies or modes; and terrorism is
one of these strategies. Why do adversaries adopt terrorism as the strategy in
conflict?

Four sets of conditions jointly affect the strategies adopted in conducting a
struggle, they are 1) the partisan’s goals, 2) the characteristics of each adversary, 3)
the relations between the adversaries, and 4) their environment.

It is important in analysis for the partisan’s goals is due to the ends help
determine the means chosen and the means tend to change as goals are modified in
the course of a struggle. In studying the characteristics of the partisan, it can be
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divided into four aspects, they are the conflict groups internal predispositions,
ideology, social structure and resources. For the relations between adversaries, we
can studying them in three ways: the kind of integration between the antagonists,
how they perceive and feel about each other, and the degree of symmetry in the
resources each controls. For the environment, it means the social context of the
adversaries. It included four categories: the institutions of the opponents social
system, the norms and prevailing ways of thinking in their environment, the role of
other parties and other systemic features of their environment (the distribution of
resources and the degree of integration among the members).

This thesis will develop the above four aspects in discussing why the adversaries
will adopt terrorism as a strategy. The spread out of terrorism all over the world after
the 11th Septembe r incident may have a influence on the social context which change
the norms and prevailing of thinking of the adversaries party.

The use of terrorism as a conflict strategy will also generate conflict escalation
which will increase in the severity of coe rcive inducements and the increase in the
scope of participation within a conflict.

In addition, the process of de-escalation will be used in the thesis for assessing
the future of the security threats in Indonesian and why the Jakarta government is
difficult in dealing with the separatist threats and the ideological threats.

Chapter Outline
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature Review
In this chapter, the conceptual framework; the theoretical background and some key
concepts/terms will be presented; the literature review will also be appear in this
chapter

Chapter2

Historical Background on Indonesia National Security (From

Sukarno to Suharto)
In this chapter, a comprehensive analysis will be given on the national security issues,
such as the security goals and the different perspectives on security threats during the
periods of both Sukarno and Suharto.

Chapter 3
Indonesia National Security in the Post-Suharto period
For this chapter, I will try to describe the overall situation of Indonesia in the
post-Suharto period; and then analysis will be given on the similarities and
differences on the national security issues between the Suharto and post-Suharto
periods. The main objective of this chapter is try to picture the present situation that
the Indonesian government is facing.

Chapter 4
Terrorism and New terrorism in Indonesia
This Chapter will act as the leading chapter for the following two chapters, I will try
to give a brief description on the history of terrorism in Indonesia first; and then
analysis will be given on how the New Terrorism has affected the country. In
addition, description on what kind of pressures from the international community
27

Chapter 1

that the Indonesian government is facing on the issues of terrorism in Indonesia will
also be provided.

Chapter 5
Secessionist Threats in Indonesia
In Chapter 2, I will try to point out that secessionist threat was one of the most
serious threats that Indonesia has been facing, so in this chapter, I will try to explain
how terrorism can infiltrate the pre-existing security threat of Indonesia; with the
theoretical framework as the background. I will also try to explain why it will be
difficult for the government to tackle it.

Chapter 6
Ideological Challenge from Islam
The basic aim for this chapter is quite similar to the previous chapter, however the
subject will be changed to Ideological/Religious threats; the other serious threats to
the national security of Indonesia. How terrorism can infiltrate into this pre-existing
threat and why it will be difficult for the government to tackle it.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
I will try to state out the general argument in this chapter, saying that “traditional”
terrorism will transform to New Terrorism in Indonesia.
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Chapter Two
Historical Background on Indonesian National Security
(From Sukarno to Suharto)

Since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in December 1949, the
country has been facing many challenges to its national security. This may have been
due to the long, bloody and harsh struggle over its independence from the Dutch1; or
may be related to being a fragmented archipelago and having a weak national identity.
In this chapter, we will have a comprehensive examination of the national security of
Indonesia during the periods of Sukarno (1949-67) and Suharto (1968-1998).

Security Goals of Indonesia

To a certain extent, the security goals for these two periods were almost the
same. It is reflected in the defense and security doctrine of Indonesia; it stated that
the ideal of the national struggle is to realize a unitary Republic of Indonesia that is
independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous, based on Pancasila 2 and the
1945 Constitution. We can see that the aim of the struggle was to transf orm the
national condition of Indonesia from a colonized and backward situation into an
independent and successful nation, which was freed from exploitation, proverty,
ignorance, backwardness, and other forms of sufferings (Departemen Pertahanan
Republik Indonesia, 1991). Based on these general ideas, 3 distinctive but closely
related security goals can be distinguished, they are sovereignty; unity and integrity;
and stability (Anwar, 1998, p.484).
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At the top of the security agenda of Indonesia is to maintain itself as an
independent and sovereign state. As a country that suffered from colonialism and
foreign exploitation for centuries and which obtained its independence only after a
long and bloody revolutionary war, Indonesia came regard to its independence and
sovereignty highly.

The

post-independence

leaders

thought that

without

independence and sovereignty the Indonesian nation could not achieve any of the
other national goals. As a result, Indonesia is generally opposed to any activities that
may impin ge on its sovereignty. Retaining the independent status in the international
arena and maintaining its sovereignty over the territories thus becomes the
nonnegotiable line for the government. Other security goals serve this primary
objective.

Maintaining national unity and integrity is equally important to the previous
security goal in the view of the post-independence leaders. D ue to the basic
weakness of a newly-formed multi-ethnic country, they thought that unity among the
peoples and the unity of the territories was crucial to the national security of
Indonesia. Pancasila is such an ideology that would be used to unite people of
different religious backgrounds. Nationwide acceptance of Pancasila as the sole
foundation of the state and other sociopolitical organizations was regarded as a
primary security goal by the government, especially the military (Anwar, 1998,
p.486).

Actually speaking, the practice of Pancasila and the military did make a
significant role in the nationalist struggle during the period between 1945 to 1949 as
well as the primary stage of the country. As mentioned before, maintaining national
unity and solidarity was crucial to a newly formed country. The practice of Pancasila
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act as an important strategy to ensure ideological conformity. It is a state ideology
which require the total acceptance of all Indonesians, and the only ideological basis
of political parties and the social organizations. The five principles (refer to endnotes)
were intended to provide the spiritual and philosophical basis for a secular
Indonesian state. The most important aspect of the Pancasila is the lack of direct
reference to Islam, an omission intended to enable persons of all religious to follow
the precepts. This help to create a harmony environment for those who are
non-Muslims, which may enhance the solidarity of the country (Anwar, 1998,
pp .499-504).

Besides the practice of Pancasila, military also took a crucial role in the
nationalist struggles and in the primary stage of the country. It might be due to the
historical background of the military. The Indonesian national military, TNI was
officially established on October 1945, with strong background in struggling with the
colonists. The origin of the Indonesian army was in the pro-independence militia
formations organized by Indonesian nationalists after the Japanese surrender in 1945.
the aim of the TNI was to defend the Republic’s independence.

Because of such a background, the military came to view itself as the guardian
of national unity and cohes ion and act as a co-equal to the civilian political
leadership. Indonesian army thought that they should take an active part in politics to
ensure stability and central control, thus, they have developed an ideological and
legal framework to support a formal role in political affairs, which was named ‘dual
function’ (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.7-12)

The implementation of the ‘dual function’ in Indonesia did make a great impact
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on the political side of the country, for example, even until nowadays, the military
still have a strong voice in politics. More will be discuss in later chapters.

A unitary form of government based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution
was a way to make sure the territories is in a unified form. At the very beginning of
the indepe ndence period, the Dutch wanted to introduce a federal system for
Indonesia after the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, asking for a setting up
of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. However, suspicions came from
the nationalist leaders who viewed such a federal system as acting as an attempt to
preserve Dutch influence in Indonesia and weaken Jakarta’s control over the
archipelago (Anwar, 1998, p.486). Therefore, they wanted a unitary system in
Indonesia, under which the provinces depended politically and economically on the
central administration.

Under the security agenda of Indonesia, stability acted as the prerequisite for the
first two security goals. To the leaders, there was a general fear that political
instability in one area would be regarded as a sign of weakening government control
and thus would lead to turbulence in other parts of the country, which would weaken
national integration. If things were happening in this way, those anti-government
forces within the country could use such a chance to damage the solidarity of the
country through infiltration and subversion. So, any kind of political disturbances,
even the overt criticisms of government policy were usually not tolerated, since they
might undermine the government’s authority. In the government’s view, political
stability entailed a strong executive control over the country, for both the Sukarno’s
and Suharto’s government had an interest in maintaining loyalty to the 1945
Constitution since it gives enormous power to the executive; it enabled the
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government to accumulate and centralize power.

If the security goals for these two periods are almost the same, does it mean that
Sukarno and Suharto ha d the same views over security issues in Indonesia? T he
answer is definite ly not, for the main difference between them was their different
perspectives towards the threats that the country was facing.

National Security under Sukarno period

Sukarno saw the most immediate threats to Indonesian security coming from the
external side, which is totally different to Suharto, who saw the greatest threats to the
national security of the country coming from within the country itself. These
different perceptions were reflected in their policies towards national security.

Sukarno’s view led him to launch a confrontation against the West, as well as
against the new Malaysian federation, which he saw as an encirclement of Indonesia.
The conflicts with the Netherlands over the sovereignty of West Irian3 even more
consolidated the hostility of Sukarno towards the West. In his view, the world was
not divided in terms of the global ideological conflict between capitalism and
communism, but rather in terms of the “nationalist struggle the world over against
colonialism and imperialism” (Anwar, 1998, p.481). Unlike the independence history
of Malaysia or the Philippines, Indonesia had to fight for its independence from the
Dutch through a revolutionary war between 1945 and 1949. That revolutionary
experience promoted an ambivalent worldview for Sukarno; it led him to believe that
Indonesia’s independence and national unity were directly threatened by foreign
powers, in particular by the former colonial and imperialistic states, which continued
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to maintain their military presence in the neighboring countries.

It does not mean that there were no internal threats during the period of Sukarno,
for, in fact, ideological conflicts over religions, political orientations or on which
political system and structure that the new republic should take were quite serious at
that time. One example was the argument between the “administrators” and the
“solidarity” makers 4. However, Sukarno’s anti-colonialism determined the whole
strategies and policies on national security of Indonesia during this period. The
covert help given by the British and the Americans to the regional rebellions that
took place in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958 5 even strengthened the suspicion that
the presence of the British bases in Malaya and Singapore, as well as the base in the
Philippines, were actually aimed at containing Indonesia.

Many scholars have analysed the reasons behind Sukarno’s anti-colonialism.
Some said that it was a continuing attempt by an “emerging nation to forge its
national integration.” (Reinhardt, 1971), while others said that since he was a
“fervent nationalist” (Bunnell, 1966), the strong sense of nationalism is the reason
behind that. However, Anwar has a more comprehensive analysis, suggesting that
while there is no doubt that Sukarno’s anti-colonialism was genuin e, he used the
struggle against an external enemy as a rallying point to unite the polarized national
elites and to keep himself in power (Anwar, 1998, p.482). The reason is that at the
very beginning, the development programmes which were proposed by the
“administrators” would weaken the political position of the “solidarity makers”, thus
the “solidarity makers” were opposed to them. By practicing the liberation campaign
on West Irian and the confrontation against Malaysia, Sukarno left little room for the
“administrators” who wanted to focus on internal stability and economic
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rehabilitation.

We cannot dismiss the idea that the anti-colonial struggles were meant to
prevent any threats to the security of Indonesia; however, to certain extent, it was
also a practise by Sukarno to consolidate his power over the country.

National Security under Suharto

After the abortive coup in 1965 6, Suharto’s New Order government came into
power. Unlike Sukarno, he emphasized the domestic aspect, believing that the
greatest threats to Indonesian national security came from within the country itself. It
was because Indonesia was a newly independent country with a highly
heterogeneous population. Most people were still poor and barely educated, living in
fragmented territory, thus, the commitment to a national identity as an Indonesian
had not spread equally throughout the archipelago. This could act as a potential threat
to the unity and integrity of the country as well as to the stability of the society. In
order to overcome this basic weakness, Suuharto shifted the priorities in the security
agenda from anti-colonial struggles to internal political stability and economic
development.

Generally speaking, during the Suharto period, the government was faced with
two types of major internal threats: one was the ideological threats from communism
and Islam, the other was the secessionist threats.

Just like many other governments at that time, at the height of the Cold War, the
New Order government regarded communism as the most dangerous ideology.
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During the late 1950s and early 1960s, both the military and communists gained
influence and emerged as the two main contending forces. In addition, the previous
history on the armed rebellion which had been practiced by the PKI (Indone sia
Communism Party) in September 1948 in an attempt to seize control of the national
leadership made Suharto become more cautious of the communists. The involvement
of PKI in the coup at 1965 had consolidated the government’s suspicions about the
possibility of a leftist subversion. Because at that moment, the PKI has become the
third largest communist party in the world, which was the largest communist party
outside the communist bloc. Although PKI was banned within days of the abortive
coup, Suharto still believed that undetected communist members were still active,
waiting for opportunities to undermine the government’s authority through radical
activities, like demonstrations or labor strikes. So, PKI was suppressed under the
New Order administration (Neher, 2000, pp.104-08).

Besides communism, the government feared political Islam since some radical
Islamic groups, such as Darul Islam, had tried to reject Pancasila as the ideological
foundation of the Indonesian Republic and wished to set up an Islamic State. To
certain extent, such an Islamic threat can always infiltrate into a secessionist
movement, such as in Aceh. (More will be discussed in the later chapters)

In addition, the government also viewed the secessionist movements7 as a
threat to the idea of Indonesia as a nation-state as well as to its territorial integrity.
The secessionist movements were active in three areas during the Suharto period:
Aceh, West Irian Jaya and East Timor.

Aceh, once a powerful Islamic sultanate, was one of the last parts of the
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archipelago to fall under Dutch control in 1913. The Acehnese leaders supported the
Indonesian revolution of 1945 to 1949, expecting that the new state would recognize
their regional distinct history and status (Huxley, 2002, p.35). However, such a thing
did not happen under Sukarno’s administration since he wanted to centralize his
power. Trouble began when the central government incorporated Aceh into the
province of North Sumatra, trying to reducing its status from a province to a district
in early 1953. Jakarta interpreted the protest from the Acehnese as a revolt and tried
to fix it by means of the military. Government military action pushed the province
into an open revolt led by Daud Beurenh8, but the rebellion was finally quashed by
Sukarno’s government in 1959, when the central government finally assigned it a
“special region” status with autonomy in religious and customary laws. However, the
tension between the central and Aceh did not improve even under Suharto’s
administration. It was because Suharto’s centralization of political and economic
power during the 1970s and 1980s provided resentment. The most crucial complaint
was about the exploitation of the province’s huge natural gas resources, for the
Acehnese feel that they should ha ve benefited more from this natural wealth. Instead,
the 1945 Constitution stated clearly that all the country’s natural resources belong to
the state.

Although Daud Beureuh and most of his followers returned to the fold of the
Indonesia Republic, a few, such as Hasan di Tiro9 continued the struggle to set up an
independent Acehnese state (Aceh Merdeka) through the Free Aceh Movement
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Suharto responded by crushing it militarily. Yet by
the late 1980s, GAM had reestablished itself as an underground political and military
force, and in 1989 it began attacking Indonesia security forces. Order was restored
only after the government launched a major military offensive spearheaded by the
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elite Special Force Command (Kopassus). Between 1989 and 1991, the security
forces killed approximately 2000 Acehnese, the great majority of them were unarmed
civilians. The province was designated a Area of Military Operations (DOM).
Although the Indonesia’s forces had largely suppressed the rebellion, the DOM
period has provoked hostility in most Acehnese, including many who did not support
GAM.

The case in West Irian Jaya (also known as Papua) is much more intractable
than Aceh since the majority populations are Melanesian people, who were ethnically
distinct from Indonesia’s population and included many Christians. In 1962, West
Irian Jaya was finally made part of Indonesia. The Dutch had supported West Papuan
nationalism in an attempt to abort Indonesia’s takeover of West Irian Jaya. In the
same yea r, anti-Indonesian dissidents founded the Papua Youth Movement
(Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM); by 1964, this had evolved into the Papua
Freedom Movement which was led by Permenas Ferry Awom and began to start an
armed rebellion for the independence of Western Irian Jaya. There were at least 17
major offensives between 1971 and 1984; the central government again tried through
the means of military suppression to solve this problem. Human rights group claim
that more than 100000 people in the province have been killed by the Indonesian
forces since 1963.

In fact, the fundamental problems relating to West Irian Jaya arise from the huge
gap in the level of development between the local economy and the rest of
Indonesia 10; in addition, Jakarta’s policies on migr ation and resource underscored the
political unrest that periodically erupted in West Irian Jaya, so stimulating support for
the separatist movement.
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East Timor was once a tiny Portuguese colony, and Indonesia’s founding fathers
had never seriously envisaged this area to become part of their country until 1975. In
August, the Portuguese began to withdraw from East Timor and civil war broke out
after the Portuguese left. Three major parties emerged in East Timor. The UDT
(advocated continuing the association with Portugal) launched a coup against the
Fretilin (demanded independence for East Timor), which had seizes control after the
Portuguese left; and Apodeti (support the idea on integration with Indonesia) later
joined with the UDT. Two days later, the UDT, Apodeti together with two small
parties, Kota and Trabalhista, proclaimed East Timor to be part of Indonesia. On
November 28th 1975, the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Fretilin)
declared the independence of East Timor, but this unilateral declaration was rejected
by both Indonesia and Portugal. Two days later, in December 1975, Indonesia
annexed East Timor and Suharto signed a bill on the integration of East Timor into
the country on 17th July 1976, officially making East Timor becomes the 27th
province of Indonesia. However, Indonesia sovereignty over East Timor was not
recognized by the United Nations, as well as most members of the international
community. Portugal and several other Western countries even have accused Jakarta
of forcibly annexing the former Portuguese colony. The primary reason for
Indonesia’s occupation was due to a fear that the territory might become a vector of
communist influence in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of anti-communist
forces in Indochina. The East Timorese (basically lead by Fretilin) immediately
began an armed independence movement to resist the Indonesians. In 1991, the
Indonesian troops killed several hundred unarmed East Timorese who were
organizing a demonstration. After this event, the so-called “Dili Massacre”, Western
criticisms of Indonesia over the East Timor issue intensified. East Timor thus became
a diplomatic burden to the New Order government.
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Generally speaking, in countering the internal threats, Suharto’s government had
used certain strategies including the management of ideological conformity, the
practise on Hankamrata (Total People’s Defense System), tight sociopolitical control
of society and economic development.

From the view of Suharto, to ensure ideological conformity through the
enforcement on the total acceptance of Pancasila as the state ideology was one of the
most important strategies for internal control11 . In addition, he sought to limit
popular political participation by keeping a tight control on nongovernmental
organizations and the labor unions and restricting the operations of the mass media.
These were the approaches to ensure a stable society by the New Order government.
Moreover, economic development was viewed as a prerequisite for political stability,
because uneven economic development could breed ethnic and class conflicts and
undermine political stability and national unity, so the government in principle
pursued the “development trilogy” 12. Until the eve of the Asian financial crisis in
1997, Indonesia’s economic growth under Suharto was among the most remarkable
the world has seen. With averaged 7 to 8 percent increased in the GDP’s growth rate
of the country during 1966 to 1997. Moreover, the poverty levels have been brought
down from 60 percent to around 14 percent during the New Order period. For the per
capita income of the Indonesian, it also began to rise above the $US260 it was in
1970 to over $US500 by 1980 (Vatikiotis, 1998, pp.33-37).

Conclusion

To conclude, no matter whether the strategies were either the anti-colonial
struggle by Sukarno or the desire on internal control by Suharto, there was only one
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aim behind them---to try to achieve all the security goals in the security agenda and
combat all the security threats to Indonesia. However, the most crucial question
concerns the continuity of these strategies. Is it possible to practise them after the end
of the three decade’s long authoritarian rule? In the next chapter, we will have a look
on the national security issues after the fall of Suharto.

Notes
1

Indonesia unilaterally declared its independence on 17th August 1945, but the Dutch only
transferred sovereignty to the new republic in the last days of December 1949 as agreed at the Round
Table Conference in the Hague
2
Pancasila, or the Five Principles, were introduced as the ideological basis of the Indonesian republic
shortly before the proclamation of independence. The five principle are Belief in One God;
Humanitarianism; Indonesia Unity; Democracy, and Social Justice.
3
This part was not included in the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch colonial power to the
Republic of Indonesia in December 1949.
4
The “administrators”, led by Vice President Mohammad Hatta, were primarily concerned with
governance and with developing the national economy. This group of leaders supported a negotiated
settlement of the West Irian Issue. For the “solidarity makers”, led by Sukarno, the revolution was not
yet over because West Irian had not been returned to the republic. This group stressed independence
and advocated a confrontation against all forms of colonialism and imperialism.
5
There were regional rebellions took place in Sumatra and Sulawesi which called PRRI
(Revolutionary Government of the Republic Indonesia) and PERMESTA (Universal People’s
Struggle). The two rebellious movements, led by local military commanders, the former based in West
Sumatra and the latter in North Sulawesi.
6
The coup still remains as a mysterious and arguable topic even until today. Basically, there are three
interpretations on the coup. The first one suggest that an internal army affair devised by junior officers
which is independent of outside influence. A second view suggested that Suharto had a hand in the
coup plotting. The third interpretation suggested that the army rebels were colluding with Sukarno and
the PKI to set up a socialist state to be led at least initially by Sukarno.
7
Publicly the government refers to these regional secessionist movements as GPK, which stands for
Security Disturbance Bandit Groups, a pejorative term that denies their legitimacy as political groups
8
He tried to launched an armed struggle to establish an Acehness Islamic state.
9
As a former Darul Islam envoy and businessman descended from pre-colonial sultans, established
the Aceh-Sumatra Liberation Front in 1976.
10
Most of the Irianese depend for their livelihood on hunting and gathering.
11
This ideological conformity is enforced through “Penataran P-4”(training on understanding and the
implementation of Pancasila) training to enhance national understanding and devotion to Pancasila at
all levels of society.
12
This means political stability, economic growth, and equitable distribution of development benefits.
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Chapter Three
Indonesian National Security in the Post-Suharto period

No regime lasts forever, not even Suharto’s New Order. On 20th May 1998, after
ten days of student -led Reformasi movement protests, Suharto was forced to step
down1 and the New Order’s administration thus came to the end. Indonesia entered
into a new era. However, the question is whether Indonesia has entered into a more
stable era or a chaotic era? In this chapter, we are going to focus on the national
security issues of Indonesia in the post-Suharto era. Basically, Indonesia has been
faced with two security threats in the post -Suharto period, they were the secessionist
threats and the ideological challenge from Islam.

Generally speaking, there has been a perceptible change in Indonesia’s political
culture in the post-Suharto period. The authoritarian bureaucratic -military vision of
the state and society that dominated the Suharto era has been replaced by a greater
emphasis on civil society and political parties as the primary focus of order and
stability. The stepping down of Suharto opened the way for a considerably more open
and liberal political system. How did the change in the political dimension affect the
national security of Indonesia?

National Security in the Post-Suharto Perio d

As stated in the previous chapter, the major threats to the national security of
Indonesia in the Suharto period were the secessionism and the ideological threats
from communism and Islam. Under the post-Suharto period, these two factors are
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still the most crucial threats towards the national security of the country; however,
due to the change in the international political environment (the end of Cold War in
the early 90s contribute to the decline of world communism), the ideological threat
from communism has became less important. S o, in what ways has the fall of
authoritarian rule affected the security threats in Indonesia?

Suharto’s favored instruments in dealing with the security threats were the
management of ideological conformity, tight sociopolitical control of society and
military repression. However, after the fall of Suharto, his successor, Habibie (June
98-October 99) initiated many significant reforms2, trying to create a more open
political atmosphere since he wanted to escape from the legacy of being Suharto’s
protégé3. Under such a situation, the favored tools of the past were no longer
appropriate. Those kinds of unstable factors that were previously suppressed could
now be expressed. Crouch stated, “The fall of Suharto’s regime allowed regional
resentment against Jakarta to rise to the surface.” (Wee, 2002, p.1)

Separatist movements have escalated so sharply after the independence of East
Timor in 1999; international reportage and analysis have highlighted the growth of
strong centrifugal forces within Indonesia, often claiming that the country might
fragment along the lines of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (The Economist,
9/12/2000, p.86). The future integrity of the state has come into question. At the
same time, the Islamic organizations were quick to capitalize on the liberal political
conditions and newfound freedoms of the press and organization. A very good
indicator is that in the first democratic election of the House of Representative at
June 1999, beside Megawati’s PDI-P (Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle) and
Golkar, which had dominated 55% of the seats, most of the remaining seats went to
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six Muslim-oriented parties. 4 Some of the radical Islamic politicians, like Hamzah
Haz, vice president in Megawati’s government, have argued that sharia law should be
enforced on all Muslims, which would be achieved by inserting a“Jakarta Charter”,
obliging all “adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law” into the constitution
(Wee,2002, p.4). It will intensify the ideological threat in Indonesia. However, more
serious is that some radical Islamic groups such as Jemaah Islamiah (Islamic
Assembly), are even supporting the movement in the establishment of Islamic state.
Such a practice will endanger the integrity of Indonesia, and thus act as a threat to the
national security. Therefore, separatism and ideological threats still exist and have
become more serious in Indonesia. In the following paragraphs, we will first looking
on the separatist movement in the post-Suharto period, and then the ideological
threats will be discussed later on.

Secessionist Movements in Post-Suharto Period

All the administration including Habibie, Wahid(October 1999-July 2001) and
Megawati(July 2001-present) in the post-Suharto era have shown an inability to
control the growing of separatism. Some scholars suggest that it may be due to the
offer of independence to the East Timorese which accelerated demands for the
independence in Aceh and Irian Jaya (such as Bourchier and Hadiz). However, some
scholars, like Tim Huxley, did not go along with this view because the reason for the
Indonesia’s founding leaders in incorporate with East Timor was due to the
prevention of communist infiltration. They had never seriously envisaged this
Portuguese colony becoming part of their country due to the different colonial
history in which the Timorese may not identify with Indonesian (Huxley, 2002, p.33).
From my point of view, no matter who is right or wrong, to certain extent, at least,
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the East Timor issue made Habibie ’s government and the Indonesia National Army
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) become humiliated. At the same time, the violence
in East Timor also damaged the central authority of Jakarta it is because the violence
both before and during the referendum was believed to be supported by the Indonesia
military has clearly demonstrated that the High Command may be unable to control
the behavior of the troops in the field or due to the historical factor of the military
5

(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.23-25). The East Timor issue not only damaged the

creditability of the Habibie’s government but also anger the other separatists in the
country, make the government more difficult in negotiate with them. Moreover, this
issue opened the first major crack in Indonesia territorial integrity, which may act as
a precedent for other periphery areas.

Therefore, although East Timor may not have the same strategic value as Aceh
and Irian Jaya have, the East Timor issue still act as a precedent issues. It was doubt
that the violence was carried out with the support of some elements of the Indonesia
army, particularly the elements of the Army Special Forces Command (They were
formed to defend their communities against attacks by pro-independence Faliatil
guerrillas, which dated back to the 1970s).

For a long time, Jakarta ’s government has been using military measure, to
suppress separatist sentiment, therefore, the relationship between the government and
the military is also a crucial factor in studying this issue (Huxley, 2002, p.45).
Although the three presidents in the post-Suharto era had all realized the importance
of reform of the military6, none of them could succeed.

For example, despite the Habibie government ’s promise to prosecute military
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personnel for abuses in Aceh, atrocities continued, notably the murder of an Islamic
teacher and 57 of his students in July 1999 (Huxley, 2002, p.36). In addition, the
widespread violence both before and during the referendum in East Timor in August
to September 1999 were both indicators to show that Habibie’s government had no
effective control over TNI operation around Indonesia ’s periphery. Similar cases also
happened under the rule of Wahid, since Wahid wished for a political settlement on
the Aceh issue, while the military favoured a hardline approach. Although Wahid had
successfully removed General Wiranto from the cabinet after the national and UN
investigations on human right abuses, he calculated that in order to retain the TNI’s
cooperation7, the speed and extent of military reform had to be moderated. F or
example, the TNI was subsequently allowed considerable leeway in organizing its
own affairs. The lack of intention and ability in controlling or constraining the power
and influence of the armed forces may intensify or deepen the secessionist threat. It
may be because the TNI will get benefits from the secessionist activities. As Tim
Huxley suggests, “The TNI’s clear determination to impose hard-line solutions in
Aceh and Papua has reinforced concerns that the military sees these and other
peripheral conflicts as “projects ”, where money is made, reputations are built and
promotions gained” (Huxley, 2002, p.45). Megawati also showed a common interest
with the TNI officers in containing a perceived growing threat from separatist
sentime nt since she has placed maintaining national unity as the highest objective for
her government. It was widely expected that the Megawati’s administration would be
less willing to implement significant reforms affecting the TNI, and more likely to
allow the military to crush secessionist movements in order to maintain national
unity.

The local business activities, such as the financial benefit from Pertamina and
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ExxonMobil, provided as much as 75% of TNI’s funding. Moreover, the secessionist
conflict can he lp to maintain the TNI’s residual political influence in the central
government since the TNI could define itself as the only force capable of preventing
the disintegration of Indonesia. Therefore, the armed forces have had both political
and economic reasons for prolonging the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Given this
context, it is impossible that measures such as special autonomy bills 8 and dialogue
can settle down the secessionist movement in the absence of considerable further
progress in strengthening civilian control over the TNI.

The use of special autonomy bills on Aceh and Irian Jaya can only just maintain
stability temporarily. It is because while local political elites were likely to benefit
politically and materially from the provinces, it seems unlikely that resistance to
Indonesian control will end until permission for independence is received.

As a whole, both the measures that had been practiced by the post-Suharto
government, the military repression and special autonomy bills can only suppress or
delay the problems but not completely solve the problem. T he situation has become
more complicated under the post-Suharto era since the more open political
atmosphere throughout Indonesia and the greater freedoms for political, cultural and
religious expression allowed by special autonomy can further boost separatist
sentiment and spread to other province s, such as Riau and Sumatra.

Ideological Challenge by Islam

Actually the ideological threat from Islam can be viewed as a conflict between
secularism and Islamism; within this conflict, there are two sides, modernist and
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radicalist. For the modernist side, groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
Muhammadiyah, despite their Islamic precepts, generally speaking, they agree with
the Pancasila as the ideology of the state and support the idea of a secular state; they
just want to focus on their mandate of religious, cultural and social activities. For the
radical side, they try to adopt the Islamic shariah law to become the law of the land;
this group of people was led by vice president Hamzah Haz as a coalition of Islamic
parties9. This has alarmed Indonesia ’s non-Muslims, who fear the erosion of the
secular constitution. Moreover, there are militant groups with more violent means of
asserting their aim of making Indonesia as an Islamic state; such as Jemaah Islamiah
and Laskar Jihad. More will be presented in the later chapters.

To certain extent, the challenge of Islam radicalism can be treat as a legacy from
the Suharto period. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in order to maintain an
integr ated and stable country10 , Suharto’s New Order attempted to depoliticize
Indonesian Islam. Although Suharto was successful in politically defa nging Islam, as
a social force it grew tremendously. By the mid-1980s, the New Order government
began to reach out to Islamic movements to help legitimize the regime due to the
weakening support for his presidency from the armed forces and the slowing of
economic growth. Therefore, one of the reasons to proliferate or expand was due to
the relaxation of the political constraints in the post-Suharto period. However the
practice of Suharto towards the Islamic groups also acted as a favourable factor for
the growth of Islamic movements.
In the longer term, Islamic radicalism could damage Indonesia ’s stability and
national cohesion. In addition, the Islamic resurgence was also brought on by
economic factors, for the economic hardships since the mid-1990s could further
reinforce the widespread popular disillusionment with the mainstream political elite,
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making them seem corrupt and self-seeking. Moreover, due to the US-led war in
Afghanistan, Iraq and the Palestinian crisis since around 2002, anti-western
sentiment has grown. T his may further undermine mainstream political leaders
legitimacy unless they keep a distance from the West. All of the above factors will
affect Megawati in adopting the national security agenda, thus affecting the national
security of Indonesia.

As discussed before, some of the most important factors, such as rapid
economic growth and the role of the armed forces in suppressing political, ethnic and
religious dissent, which had effectively cemented Indonesia’s diverse ethnic and
religious communities together under Suharto, have weakened since 1998. Such a
change in Indonesia has opened a way for the new threat to the national security, and
that is the communal violence conflict, such as the one in Maluku and Poso in
Central Sulawesi. These kinds of communal conflict were mainly due to the two
different ethnic groups with different religious background which are living in the
same area, for example, the Muslims and the Christians in Maluku and Poso; and the
Dayaks and Madures in K alimantan. The main reason behind such a scenario was the
transmigration programme by the Jakarta central government. Generally speaking,
the transmigration programme was started in the late 60s. The programme aimed at
population redistribution. Until now, almost 10 million people from overcrowded
regions, mainly Java, Bali and Madura, has been settled in less populated provinces
particularly in East Indonesia. However, this programme fail to assess the social,
cultural and environment background of the target region and people living there,
which set a base for the communal conflict. For example, in Maluku, at first the
majority population is Christian, however, after the transmigration, Muslim
constituate 57% of the population there. It has affect the demographic balance
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between different ethnic groups, causing economic and politic al competition over
scare resources, thus stimulate the inter-ethnic conflict

In the past, due to the strong rule by Suharto, and the economic achievement, all
dissent in those areas could be suppressed. However, after the fall of Suharto,
democratization and decentralization has heightened political competition in local
politics and the control of local natural resources. Together with the downturn in the
economy, these factors intensified and contribute d to the outbreak of violence
(Huxley, 2002, pp.55-57). The conflict in Maluku since 1999 has left as many as
10,000 people dead and created 500,000 refugees in a population of 2.4 million
(Jakarta Post, 6/9/2001). Although the communal conflicts was not so serious as the
secessionist threat and the ideological threat which could lead to the disintegration of
Indonesia, the communal conflict will really act as a destabilizing force in the society
which will damage the legitimacy of the central government, thus acting as a threat
to the security of Indonesia.

Conclusion

To conclude, the end of the Suharto’s era has created a more open political
environment in Indonesia. However, under such a new situation, the security threats
in the past not only still exist, but have also been intensif ied. In addition, new threats
have also been created under the post Suharto era. It seems that the Habibie and
Wahid administrations did not have the ability to deal with those threats; and the
present situation shows that the threats have an escalating trend. Therefore, will
Megawati’s government have the faith and ability in dealing with these threats,
especially under a new era after the September 11th incident?
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Notes
1

Scholars have different views on the step down on Suharto, but basically, most scholars believed it
was due to two factors, they were economy and politics. The economic crisis that began in the middle
of 1997 was the trigger only. What ultimately brought him down was the weakness of the political
system he created and the threats behind the economic success. The New Order began to lose its
coherence because its political architecture could no longer accommodate the tremendous social
changes that had taken place over the past two decades.
2
Habibie had initatiated many reforms after he became the president, such as restoring press freedom,
releasing political prisoners and holding the first democratic election since 1955.
3
He faced an immediate crisis of legitimacy when he came to office as a non-elected President by
virtue of being Suharto’s vice-president.
4
These parties are National Awakening Party (PKB), United Development Party (PPP), National
Mandate Party (PAN), Crescent and Star Party (PBB) and Justices Party (PK).
5
The military may try to use the violence in East Timor as an object lesson to other provinces that
may have hard secessionist mindor simply as redistribution
6
The leaders in the post-Suharto period realize that the TNI’s interference in non-military spheres
might seriously obstruct the new government’s programme.
7
As parliamentary opposition to Wahid’s presidency grew, he highlighted the TNI’s continuing
political significance by attempting to use it as an instrument to protect his own position. T herefore,
his weakening political position meant that he and his government had little effective sanction over
the TNI’s behaviour.
8
In May 1999, Habibie approved laws decentralize regional administration and finance. Law 22/1999
allowed for the election by regional parliaments of provincial governors and district heads. Law
25/1999 tried to equalize grants between central and local.
9
The coalition included three parties, they are PPP, PBB and PK
10
Suharto’s regime tried to steer a middle course between the far left(PKI) and the far right(the
Islamicist).
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Chapter Four
Terrorism and New Terrorism in Indonesia

A year after the September 11 incident 1 , the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 killed
202 people and seriously injured another 350. It was the deadliest terrorist attack since
the September 11 incident. This tragedy leaves a stigma both on Indonesia and the
Southeast Asian region, even the world. It is because only after the tragedy of Bali did
the Jakarta government start to believe in “the presence of a clandestine terrorist
network” in Indonesia (Guna ratna, 2003, p.4); moreover, it drew attention from the
world that Indonesia or the Southeast Asian region would act as a heaven for terrorist
attacks. Under such a scenario, President Megawati’s government has been faced with a
huge pressure from two sides; internally, such kinds of terrorist attack will greatly
damage the social stability and economy within the country; externally, international
pressure such as the voices from US and Australia asking for a crack down on local
militants which are suspected of Al-Qaeda ties has been increasing. Indonesia has been
faced with a new threat in a new era. This chapter will try to analyze how the New
Terrorism affects the national security of Indonesia first, then we will focus on how
Megawati’s government has been dealing with such a threat.

Context behind New Terrorism
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In chapter one, we have came across the difference between “traditional” terrorism
and New Terrorism; now, we will go in depth to see what kind of factors contributed in
transforming the “traditional” one to a “New” one.

The context behind the emergence of new terrorism at the global level is the change
in the political environment and globalization. The change in political environment
means the end of Cold War and the coming of the post cold war era; and globalization
stands for the increase in integration and linkage all over the world through the dramatic
developments in telecommunications and information. All these factors help to
transform the nature of the “traditional” terrorism into new terrorism.

The ethnic conflicts and disintegration of states in various places, such as
Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union in the post Cold War period have
encouraged the use of asymmetrical warfare. It is because there is only one superpower
in the world after the fall of Soviet Union, so from the perspectives of the terrorists,
asymmetrical warfare, such as using weapons of mass destruction (which are targeted at
civilian infrastructure), may be the only means to counter states with much more
superior conventional military capabilities(Tan, 2003, p.88). Therefore, the change in the
political context at the post-Cold War era can help to explain why the terrorist groups
nowadays are far more lethal than the traditional one. The reason is, they think that they
can only use unconventional methods to challenge the conventional power under a
unipolar world. In order to increase the power of such unconventional ways, they tend to
practice mass casualty terrorist acts, which hope for create widespread panic in society.
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So, New Terrorism always sees violence as an end in itself, but not just a means to an
end.

The other reason or context which helps in shaping out the New Terrorism is due to
the increasing globalization2 . The development in telecommunications and information
transmission has encouraged transnational terrorist cooperation. The improved
technology made them become much more mobile, flexible, and they do not need fixed
base areas to operate from (Hoffman, 1997). Globalization has provid ed new channels
for transnational terrorism, enable terrorist groups operate in various countries, but
joining together and sharing resources sometimes, fully taking advantage of porous
borders in a rapidly globalizing world economy. Such a transnational terrorist
cooperation makes it difficult for countries tracking them.

When facing such a more violent, disintegrated terrorism, all the countries find it
hard to tackle. Indonesia was one of those countries. Terrorism has become a new threat
to the world, just as what Andrew Tan stated, “The focus in the post cold war era has
thus been on the emerging threat of post- modern terrorism.” (Tan, 2003, p.88)

With more knowledge on New Terrorism, we can now move on to the second
question, how does the New Terrorism make an impact on the national security of
Indonesia?
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The Situation in Indonesia

Basically, Indonesia has been suffered from “traditional” terrorism through the
secessionist movements and the ideological challenge from Islam (more discussion will
be in chapter five and six). “Traditional” terrorism was act as a conflict strategy for the
secessionists and the radical religious group(s) in achieving their goal(s).

The influence of “traditional” terrorism was not so explicit during the Sukarno and
Suharto period. It may be due to the tight control under the authoritarian rule of Sukarno
and Suharto (refer to Chapters two and three), together with the military suppression.
Terrorist acts at that period were being settled or suppressed within a short period of
time.

However, there has been a tendency for “traditional” terrorism in Indonesia to turn
into New Terrorism in the post-Suharto period. A good indicator of this trend is on the
transnational cooperation among the terrorist groups, thus, the distinction between
domestic and international terrorism become evaporated (as the terrorist group outside
Indonesia can infiltrate within the domestic group, more discussion will be provide in
the later paragraphs). It was due to the change in the world context after the end of the
Cold War as mentioned before; and more importantly, was due to the change in the
internal political, social and economic environment after the fall of Suharto. This means
the political instability of the Jakarta government, the increasing influence of the
Muslims on politics and the side effects from the East Timor issue to the other
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secessionist movements. Situation became more worse with the economic downturn at
this period, in which will help to trigger out the above factors.

The cha nge in the international environment together with the change in the internal
factors contributes an appropriate scenario for the emergence of New Terrorism in
Indonesia.

Therefore, I would argue that Indonesia has not suffered from New Terrorism during
the Sukarno and Suharto periods. Only since the Bali bombing has the Jakarta
government realized that the whole country was facing a threat from New Terrorism.

The Bali and J.W. Marriott Hotel Bombing

At the night of 12 October 2002, the bomb at the Sari Club on Bali Island, with a
smaller preceding explosive at the nearby Paddy’s Bar, killed 202 people and seriously
injured another 350, which was the deadliest terrorist attack since the September 11
incident. Most of those killed were Western tourists, included 88 Australians, 23 Britain,
9 Swedes and 7 Americans. Within a month of the bombing, joint Indonesian and
foreign police arrested the head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Abubakar Baasyir 3 for his
alleged involvement in a series of church bombings in 2000 and in a plot to assassinate
Megawati; and four members of JI, which were the accused bombers, they are Amrozi,
Ali Imron, Muhlas, and Imam Samudra. The first three are bothers. Amrozi purchased
the explosives and mini- van into which the Sari Club bomb was placed. Ali Imron and
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Mukhlas were JI’s operational head, who had oversight for the attack. Imam Samudra
was the JI field commander, who leading the bombing this time (Fealy, 2003, p.3).
Finally, Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Muhlas were sentenced to death during August to
October in 2003; Ali Imron was sentenced to life in jail. For the head of JI, a court in
Jakarta acquited Abubakar Baasyir of any role in the 2000 bombing and the plot to
assassinate Megawati but still sentenced him to four years in prison for treason and
immigration violations (Elegant and Perrin, 2003, pp.18-21).

Not more than one year from the Bali bombing, on 5 August 2003, a car bombing
occurred in Jakarta. JI militants were suspected in blow up a station wagon in the drive
way of Jakarta’s J.W. Marriott hotel, 4 killing 12 and wounding more than 150 people.

There is one similarity between these two terrorist attacks, and that is, no group
claimed immediate responsibility for the attacks. The spiritual leader of JI, Baasyir, even
denies the group has ties to Al Qaeda. However, evidence shown that the two terrorist
attacks had been done by the JI, and there are some linkages between JI and Al-Qaeda.

For example, Singapore had arrested 21 Muslim citizens in August 2002, in which
19 of the m belonged to JI, because they were trying to plan some terrorist attacks. A list
of sites, such as water pipelines, Changi airport and a radar station, which the group had
been targeting was found. Moreover, Singapore also said that the 19 suspects belonged
to the same group that had earlier plotted to bomb US military and diplomatic sites. That
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plot was disclosed in January 2002 after Singapore arrested 15 JI members (Mapes,
2002).

In addition, Indonesian national police chief Da’i Bachtiar told reporters on 6 August
2003 (the day after the car bombing at Marriott) that initial evidence suggested that JI
carried out the car-bomb attack on the J.W. Marriott Hotel. Da’i said both the Marriott
and the Bali bombs were placed in vehicles whose engine numbers had been partially
erased, just as in Bali. Moreover, both bombs were detonated using cell phones and used
the same types of explosive (Mapes, 2003). The style of the attacks were quite similar,
so it was not hard to believe that the two acts were done by the same group of people.

Therefore, it is suspected that JI has been taken part in the two most serious terrorist
acts in Indonesian history. Although no evidence fully supports the direct relationship
between the terrorist acts and JI; at least one thing can be confirmed, there are linkages
between JI and Al-Qaeda.

Infiltration of Terrorism in Indonesia

According to Gunaratna, one of the strategies for the development of Al-Qaeda by
Osama bin Laden was forming alliances and coalitions with a number of local and
regional groups, so Southeast Asia of course is one of the target for building his
worldwide network. Gunaratna suggested that there are altogether five phases of
penetration of Al-Qaeda into Southeast Asia, with the initial phase which began in 1988

58

Chapter 4

of the form as creating a network that would provide the logistical and the financial
support to a number of Islamist groups in Philippines as well as in the neighborhood.
The second phase was providing technical and military assistance, such as when Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed 5 came to Philippines to train both the newly formed Abu Sayaaf
group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the use of explosives and assassination
techniques in 1991 (Gunaratna, 2003).

The next two phases were the most crucial factors in building up the origin of the
terrorism influence in Indonesia, which were secondment of very important leaders of
Al- Qaeda to Southeast Asia, (for example, Dr. Ayman Zahahiri, the deputy leader of
Al-Qaeda ) and the intensifying of trans-border cooperation.

The secondment of the important leaders of Al-Qaeda has intensified the linkage and
cooperation between Al Qaeda and the groups in the Southeast Asia region. For example,
there was cooperation between Hambali 6 , who was served in the Shura Council of AlQaeda, Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of JI, and Abubakan Baasyir, the co- founder of JI
at that time. Thus, JI has developed into a pan-Islamic network, which has absorbed two
Egyptian groups 7 and also built a very close relationship with a number of groups in the
Southeast Asia region steadfastly from 1995 onwards (Gunaratna, 2003, pp.1-3). With
the development of JI, the trans-border cooperation has emerged. At first most of the JI
members were trained in Philippines and Afghanistan; when the Camp Abubakar
complex was overrun in Philippines, the JI-Al Qaeda network shifted its training and
operation infrastructure into Poso, Sulawesi, and later on moved to Balikpapan in
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Kalimantan, which are also within the boundaries of Indonesia. Besides the location of
the terrorist training camps or bases, there were other indicators which can show the
trans-border cooperation of JI in Indonesia with Al-Qaeda, such as the flow of financial
support. According to Hambali 8 , the one who is believed to be JI’s Southeast Asia
operation chief, Al-Qaeda money helped fund the Bali bombings as well as the attack on
J.W. Marriot Hotel. In some cases, charities have been used directly by Al Qaeda to
funnel money into JI’s hands. For example, a Saudi- funded charity in Cambodia was
closed after a joint US-Cambodian investigation detected a large sum of money
deposited into the charity’s bank account, believed to be the financial support for JI. It
was because Adbul Azi, 9 who was arrested at the charity, has admitted to police that he
knew Hambali and had helped him hide out in Cambodia in early 2003; this means they
have a close relationship. Thus, the large sum of money was suspected to be the funding
for JI (Elegant and Perrin, 2003, p.20).

To conclude,

This region has had continuous infiltration by members of Al
Qaeda through the gradual infiltration of local groups via
financial and technical assistance as well as through
coordinators and experts seconded from the main Al Qaeda
group (Gunaratna, 2003, p.3)

It is clear that Indonesia is facing the threat from new terrorism. The training camps
within the country’s boundaries, the financial flows from the terrorist groups into the
country, the existence of radical militant Islamic groups and the linkages with other
terrorist groups outside are all indicators that show Indonesian national security is
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affected by the infiltration of new terrorism. The situation becomes even worse after the
September 11 incident and the US annexation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore,
Megawati’s government has faced with the pressure on the national security both from
within and outside the country.

To see how Megawati’s government is facing the pressure, it will be useful to start
from the government response to September 11 incident.

Response to September 11 incident

Actually, formulating an official government position became the first serious
challenge to the government of Megawati; it was because Megawati has caught between
international necessity on one hand and domestic political reality on the other. In
formulating the official stance, the Indonesian government was torn between two
conflicting positions (Sukma, 2003, p.57). On one hand were the government officials
who were loyal to Megawati, seeing that Indonesia had little choice but to support the
US stand on terrorism; but, at the same time, they should be bearing in mind the reaction
of the Indonesian public. On the other hand, several Islamic groups began to stage
protests on the streets of Jakarta and to express their anger at the US accusation that
Osama bin Laden had masterminded the September 11 attacks. They saw the allegation
as an attempt to make a scapegoat of Islam. Not only did some Islamic groups show
opposing attitudes towards the pro-US position, but also the vice president, Hamzah Haz,
expressed his displeasure as what he perceived to be an attempt by the US to discredit
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the Islamic world by saying that the September 11 attacks “will hopefully cleanse
America of its sins” (Sukma, 2003, p.58). It truly demonstrates that even within the
central authority, there were conflicts of views.

Finally, Megawati followed her schedule for the meeting with President George W.
Bush on September 19. During the meeting, she stressed that “Indonesia is ready to
cooperate with the US and other civilized countries on counter-terrorism” (Jarkarta Post,
21/9/01). Such an official position angered some radical Islamic groups, for example,
Jafar Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, maintained that Megawati’s visit to US
was “clearly igno red the feeling of the um’mah” (Sukma, 2003, p.58). Several hardline
Islamic groups even began to warn US nationals that they should immediately leave
Indonesia (Jarkarta Post, 22/9/01). On September 25, 2001 the MUI (Majelis Ulama
Indonesia), a semi-official body of Indonesia clerics, issues a declaration calling
“Muslims in the world for jihad fii sabilillah (a fight in the footsteps of Allah) should the
aggression of the US and its allies commit acts of aggression against Afghanistan and
the Islamic world”(Jarkarta Post, 26/9/01). The pressure was intensified after
Washington decided to attack Afghanistan. Anti-US protests began to challenge the
presidency of Megawati, and forced the government to issue a six point statement on
October 8, 200110 , in the hope of releasing the pressure. However, the government’s
position angered many radical groups in Indonesia, since the government statement not
only had stopped short of criticizing the US military campaign in Afghanistan, but was
seen as proclaiming support for Washington. The protests in Jakarta and several other
major cities thus intensified, radical groups began to burn US flags and effigies of Bush
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and threats to expel US citizens from the country were made. These events put the
government on the defensive, and it finally bowed to the pressure when, on October 14,
2001 at the Istiqlal Grand Mosque in Jakarta, Megawati issued a sharp criticism of the
US military campaign in Afghanistan. She declared that “it is unacceptable that someone,
a group or even a government – arguing that they are hunting down perpetrators of the
terror attack people or another country for whatever reason. There are rules that need to
be observed, without observing those rules, the action initially meant to combat violence
at the end would itself become a new act of terror and violence” (Sukma, 2003, p.60).
The speech was widely seen in Indonesia and abroad as a significant departure from
Indonesia’s previous stance on the issue.

To conclude, as Robert and Symonds have suggested, “Megawati’s veiled criticism
of the US [was] part of a strategy to contain the protests and opposition” (Robert and
Symonds, 2001). The change in Jakarta’s position towards the US- led anti-terror war
and the above answer both lie in Indonesia’s domestic political context, and this was the
pressures that Megawati had faced with in dealing with terrorism. Jakarta’s response to
the September 11 incident and the US led anti-terror war was like a model of its
response to the threat from terrorism. In dealing with the threat from terrorism,
Megawati must be very careful in making a balance between the internal Islamic
challenge and the fragile nature of her coalition government together with the external
criticism from other countries.
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For example, in dealing with JI, at first Indonesia has dismissed claims that the
organization was a threat, or even that it existed; but later on, after the Bali bombing,
several foreign governments, such as US and Australia said that they had strong reason
to believe that JI was involved in the blast in Bali. Under these pressures, Jakarta finally
declared the fundamentalist Islamic group, JI, a terrorist organization on October 17,
2002, five days after the Bali bombing. At the news conference of the same day, the
minister for state security of Indonesia, Mr. Yudhoyono said that Jakarta had to “respect
and believe ” the assertion that JI was part of “an international terrorist network” (Bonner
and Perlez, 2002).

The reason that Megawati’s government at first did not want to take any action on JI
was due to the influence of Islam in politics; since the head of JI had been strongly
supported by the vice president Hamzah Haz, whose support is important for Megawati.
That Megawati could become president was partly due to the significant support from
Islamic parties; 11 and she formed the coalition government with the PPP, which
chairman is Hamzah Haz, so it would be difficult for her to rule without support from
these Islamic political forces. However, on the other hand, while Singapore, Malaysia
and the Philippines have arrested dozens of suspected militants and have cooperated
closely with the US, the Indonesian authorities have done comparatively little, so such a
scenario acted to ratchet up the pressure on Indonesia to act more decisive ly against
Islamic extremists (Mapes, 2002). Unfortunately, the possibility of a political backlash
from the country’s powerful conservative Muslims had made it difficult for Megawati to
act decisively (McBeth and Wain, 2002).
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Conclusion

As a whole, Indonesia cannot avoid the threat from new terrorism, which is featuring
violent and transnational cooperation, for the Bali and Marriott Hotel bombings were an
alarm to the Jakarta that a government should act more decisively on the terror issue
since terroris m is now affecting the national security of Indonesia directly. However, it
will be a dilemma case for the Megawati’s government in dealing with the threat from
terrorism. On one hand, of course she knows that she needs to take some action on antiterroris m in order to release the pressure from foreign countries or investors. Just as John
Castle 12 said, “A decisive response could help clear the air; but a weak response would
reinforce doubts that have existed for some time about the government’s strategy in
coping with the situation. ” (McBeth and Wain, 2002). But, on the other hand, unless she
deals with the terror issue carefully, she takes the risk of being labeled “anti-Islamic” by
her opponents, which could affect the elections in 2004.

It seems that the most serious impact from terrorism to Indonesia n national security
is the damage to physical properties and human lives, thus affecting the prestige of
Indonesia on the international stage. From any point of view, the most serious impact
come from the terrorism is that –it has breached an unseen threshold, the Pandora’s Box
has been opened. This means it will be more dangerous to Indonesia if New Terrorism
has infiltrated into the pre-existing security threat of the country. In the following two
chapters, analysis will be given on whether and how New Terrorism can infiltrate into
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the pre-existing threats of Indonesia. In order to have a more systematic analysis, the
conflict cycle model will be used in the next two chapters as a guiding on the findings.

Notes
1

Approximately 5000 people were to die during this incident.
Globalization also affect the political stability of Indonesia. As mentioned before, the economic crisis in
1997 act as the trigger for the step down of Suharto. To certain extent, globalization plays an crucial role
in that crisis since foreign capital flow were much more linked and dependent on each other than before.
Therefore, if country in the region suffer, other may have a larger chance to follow.
3
There is a linkage between JI, Al-Qaeda and Baasyir, for more information, please refer to chapter six.
4
A defendant in the Bali bombing trials was to appear in a Bali court on Aug 7 2003 to hear the verdict in
his case. There was some speculation that the Marriott bombing was timed as a warning to the government
not to impose the death penalty, which Mr. Amrozi could face if convicted.
5
The head of the Al-Qaeda military committee in 1991
6
He is, for instance, operation commander of JI.He als o serves in the Shura council of Kumpulan Majelis
Mujahidin (KMM), and he is currenly become the key man for Al-Qaeda.
7
The two groups are Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic group of Egypt.
8
He was captured by US and Thai agents on August 11 2003.
9
A senior official at Cambodia’s Interior Ministry told that Azi was in charge of accounts for Hambali (in
Cambodia)
10
The Six statement are, first, the government is deeply concerned that a military attack has been carried
out; second, Indonesia notes the US statement that the operation has only been launched against terrorist
training camps and military installations, and is not an act of hostility against Islam; third, Indonesia hopes
the operation will be strictly limited, in terms of targets and duration, in order to minimize civilian
casualties; fourth, Indonesia calls on the UN to undertake a collective response to restore peace; fifth,
Indonesia warns that society should not react or express sympathy in ways that contravene the law; and
finally, Indonesia will provide humanitarian assistance to ease the suffering of the people of Afghanistan,
especially in the form of medical supplies and food.
11
Megawati came to the power as a result of the fall of her predecessor Wahid, who was impeached by the
concerted action of the Islamic parties in July 2001.
12
He is a business consultant and chairman of the International Business Chamber of Indonesia.
2
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Chapter Five
Secessionist threats in Indonesia

Indonesia is a country which is full of drawbacks since the date of its
establishment; it exhibits the classic feature of many decolonized countries, which is
the lack of a close fit between nation and state. It will usually happens when the
dominant ethnic group holds the reins of power over significant ethnic minorities that
are located at the periphery in multi-national or mullti-ethnic states. However, the
situation for Indonesia is more complicated, since there was not such a country
existing before; what such an area had in common was just the same colonial
historical background, being governed by the Dutch. Such a scenario, together with
the founding (mainly Javanese) leaders’ strong views and strategy in integrating the
whole area into one united country, helped in creating a fundamental weakness to the
country’s national security; that is the lack of political legitimacy. This has left a line
for the secessionist movements in Indonesia nowadays, just as Andrew Tan has stated,
that, “ethnic minorities, do not accept the legitimacy of the control government and
seek either an irredentist agenda or outright secession to form their own separate
states”( Tan ,2003, P.91).

In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, some general background on the secessionist
movements has been discussed; so, in this chapter, the secessionist movements in
Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua) will be analysed in more detail using the guiding
framework of the conflict cycle. These secessionists movements can be viewed as a
social conflict between the secessionists and the central government, in which the
two groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives. Such a
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conflict will be go through with some stages starting from Base to Manifestation
and then Escalation; De -escalation; finally reach to Termination and then
Consequences. Within this cycle, what is more crucial or interesting is, does
terrorism infiltrate into the secessionist movements? If yes, then why and how it can
be practise in them? If no, will terrorism infiltrate into secessionist movements one
day? What is (are) the influences(s) on the national security of the country?

Therefore, in this chapter, we will have a brief description on the secessionist
movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya first; and then we will try to apply the conflict
cycle to them, as a guiding of the findings. After that, we will examine whether
terrorism is present in the conflicts already. And finally, a discussion will be provided
on how difficult it is for the Jakarta government in tackling it.

Secessionist movement in Aceh

In chapter two and chapter three, we have already come across some
background on the case in Aceh. Generally speaking, there are five reasons for this
secessionist movement to occur. First, there is the strong ethnic identity of the
Acehnese, since they have their own culture which is different from the Javanese.
Second, the Acehnese generally hold a perception that the economic benefit from the
national wealth had been taken over by the central with no economic reward to them.
The living condition is still poor for them although they have got a huge national
resources; Third, there is resentment at the Indonesia government’s policy of
transmigration during the Suharto period, which saw as an attempt to impose
Javanese social, cultural and economic domination; Fourth, there is a rejection of the
secular orientation of the Indonesia state, which is perceived to be at odds with
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Aceh’s strict Sunni form of Islamic observance. Fifth, the legacy of bitterness left by
the military from the heavy-handed suppression has increased the resentment of the
Acehnese, especially during the period of military operation, DOM (1990-1998)
(Rabasa and Haseman, 2002; Rabasa and Chalk, 2001).

Due to the above five reasons, the secessionist movement in Aceh has been a
prolonged conflict which started from 1950s and until now, exist ing almost since the
establishment of the Republic of Indonesia. In chapter two, we have already
summarized the situation in Aceh during the Sukarno and Suharto period; and
basically, Acehnese disillusion with centralized rule was first expressed in support
for the wider Darul Islam1 rebellion in early 1950s; but this was quashed by
Sukarno’s government quickly in 1959. However, rese ntment among the Acehnesse
had not been erased even after a “special region” status was assigned by the central
government in 1959. In 1976, GAM was formed with a “non-negotiable” goal in the
creation of an Independent Islamic state of Aceh. Initially, due to limited resources
and lack of active popular support, the rebels initiated a low level insurgency
throughout the mid-1970s to mid -1980s. Only from the late-1980s, did GAM benefit
from the provision of Libyan arms and training 2. This external support allowed the
group to progressively escalate its activities, culminating in a surge of unrest between
1989 and 1990 (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, pp.27-29). In 1989, the members of GAM
began to make attacks on military and police posts (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.8).
The response from Jakarta was stern: the Suharto government declared Aceh an Area
of Military Operations (daerah operasi militer) or DOM; Aceh’s special region status
was terminated and the army was given a virtual free hand to crush the rebels all
means possible. Over one thousand Acehnese civilians were killed in the first three
years of the operation; according to the information provided by the provincial
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government in late 1998, 871 people killed outright by the army, and 387 were
missing who later turned up dead. More than 500 others were listed as “disappeared”
and never found (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.8).

The Operation of DOM successfully stymied the immediate secessionist activity;
however, it severely strained civil-military relation and have since fueled growing
radicalization and anger. By the mid to late 1990s, those resentments had changed
into widespread demonstrations of support for GAM and its violent anti-Indonesian
separatist agenda 3 (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p30).

The fall of Suharto gave the insurgency a new lease on life since many political
controls during the New Order’s period has been removed. The GAM exploited the
disarray in Jakarta and the growth of popular support for independence in Aceh to
expand its presence in the province, step up its attack, and began to set up an
alternative administration (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.102) For example, GAM
was widely believed responsible for an attack on soldiers returning from holiday
leave in late December, 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.9). Besides targeting
security personnel, GAM guerrillas also attacked strategic economic targets,
particularly the ExxonMobil natural gas facilities near Lhokseumawe in northern
Aceh, gunmen have hijacked the company’s trucks and vans traveling among
company sites in northern Aceh 50 times since 1999. In September 2000, the
members of GAM began to target company buses which carrying employees from
the town to the gas fields. There was a tendency for increasing violence , since at the
first, the buses were stopped and burned, but, when Indonesian soldiers began to
escort the buses, the secessionists attacked them and detonated roadside pipe bombs
(Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.102).
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Generally speaking, according to the book “Indonesia’s Transformation and the
Stability of Southeast Asia.”, it summarized the operation of GAM as below,

Operationally. GAM has concentrated mostly on hit-and-run attacks and
ambushes directed against the Indonesian security forces, including locally
based territorial troops and paramilitary police reinforcements units dispatched
from Jakarta. For the most part, these attacks have been low key and sporadic,
although since mid-1999 the overall scale of violence appears to have increased
(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.31).

GAM has been prepared to extend its operational focus beyond military targets,
trying to make attacks on economic targets which aim at creating economic loss to
the central government as well as destabilizing the society. The attacks on
ExxonMobil’s facilities made a total lost of $100 million a month to the central
government; production had been stopped for 4 months (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002,
p.102). More importantly, in reflecting the increase in the scale of violence, the
abuses done by the GAM were good indicators. The abuses included killings of
suspected military informants, as well as of family members of police and military
personnel, such as the case in Samalanga on May 2001; unlawful detentions, forced
expulsions, and other terrorizing of non-Acehenese, especially ethnic Javanese;
destruction of property, including homes, of personnel working for Indonesian
government institution or belonging to Indonesian political parties and systematic
extortion (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p. 22). For example, on May 19, 2001, GAM
burned six houses of Javanese in Lhoksari village of Pante Cermin, West Aceh. They
had ordered all Javanese who were working in the PT Telaga Sari Indah plantation to
leave within three days or they would be killed, one by one (Human Rights Watch,
2001b p.23). In addition, dozens of government buildings, including schools and
subdistrict administrative offices, have also been attacked or burned, forcing
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hundreds of civilians and government employees to flee to other parts of Indonesia
(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.31).

Beside the change in the political environment which favored the activities of
GAM, the more mature structure and external support for GAM are also important
factors in explaining the rapid growth and escalation of the secessionist movement.

GAM’s current armed strength is at above 1000 to 20004(Rabasa and Haseman,
2002, p.101), the members are trained to use pistols, automatic assault rifles,
explosives and even some basic armaments, like axes and machetes. Structurally, the
group is organized along functional lines, which divided into five units as , an
infantry fighting battalion (overseen by a Special Command); a police force; an
intelligence unit; a woman’s wing; and an elite karades reconnaissance squad. In
addition to the above units, a student front was responsible for collecting community
contributions , running Aceh ref ugee camps, and organizing political propaganda
(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001). GAM did benefit from the support from Libya in the late
1980s; but such assistance was largely transient and was not maintained into the
1990s. However, external ba cking was not totally absent in the 1990s, for GAM has
received financial contributions from Acehnese businessmen in Malaysia and
southern Thailand and the donations have been used in purchasing weapons from
Cambodia

5

(McBeth at el, 1999). For Indonesia’s generals, they saw Aceh’s

secessionists as much more dangerous than the poorly-armed secessionists of East
Timor and Irian Jaya ((McBeth at el, 1999). With an arms supply, financial backing
and growing popular support, the secessionist movement in Aceh will be much more
difficult to deal with than East Timor.
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The Human Rights Watch Report has summarized the violence in Aceh after the
fall of Suharto as “From February 1999 onward, four key elements came together to
facilitate the rapid growth of the independence movements; an armed guerrilla
organization, a nascent pro-independence political movement; and a highly
mobilized population looking for channels to express their frustra tion with Jakarta
over failure to address past abuses. The fourth one was the series of missteps in
Jakarta.” (Human Rights Watch, 2001b, p.9)

In Jakarta, the Habibie, Wahid and Megaw ati governments attempted to
conciliate the Acehnese through dialogue and political concessions short of granting
the province independence, since many Indonesians fear that if Aceh opted for
independence, Irian Jaya, East Kalimantan and South Sulawesi would follow.
Therefore, the current Indonesian government’s strategy in Aceh can be summarized
as “address the political and economic demands of the Acehenese, short of granting
independence, while conducting police operation with military support.”(Rabasa and
Chalk, 2001, p.34).

Based on this rationale in dealing with the conflicts in Aceh, Habibie’s
government apologized for the past abuses against Acehnese 6 and appointed a 27
member independent Commission to investigate violence in Aceh at June 1999. The
DOM status was formally lifted after the apology from Geneeral Wiranto on August
7, 1998; “non-organic” troops --- that is these not directly assigned to district,
subdistrict and other territorial commands were to be withdrawn at the end of August
1998 (Huxley, 2002 p.36). In addition, Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy,
passed under Habibie was implemented during the Wahid administration. This law
restored Aceh’s Special Autonomous Region status, which stood for a broad grant of
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autonomy that included the application of Islamic law (Sharia) to the Muslim
inhabitants and compensation for past abuses by the security forces (Wee, 2002 p.1).

Rapprochement between Jakarta and Aceh seemed possible following the
collapse of the Suharto regime ; however, the above measures did not assuage
Acehenese resentment. In early 1999, taking inspiration from the case of East Timor 7,
an all-Aceh student congress had called for a referendum to be held in Aceh. This
congress gave rise to a province-wide, student-led organization called SIRA(Sentral
Indormasi Referendum Aceh or the Aceh Referendum Information Centre), which
argued that a referendum would be a peaceful way of resolving the conflict. Under
the new administration of Wahid, the first try was to broach the possibility of a
referendum on the state of Aceh but he finally retreated after heavy criticism by the
nationalists and military. Wahid claimed that any referendum would not concern
independence, but rather the implementation of Sharia law in the province(Huxley,
2002 pp.36-37). At the same time, from mid-1999 to mid-2000, the central
government entered into negotiations with the GAM under the Auspices of a
Geneva-based conflict resolution organization, the Humanitarian Dialogue Center
(HDC) and signed a temporary cease -fire (officially called a humanitarian pause) in
Geneva on May 15, 2000. It was extended several times, most recently in February
2001(Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.10).

However, the humanitarian pause did not have a lasting effect in reducing the
level of violence8, amid the measures on political dimension 9, the GAM bega n to
move beyond sporadic attacks on police and soldiers and began setting up an
alternative administration which gradually took control over most governmental
functions from the district level through the way of replaced the village heads as well
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as reinstituted the idea of a council of village elders. They practiced it sometimes
thorough persuasion, sometimes through abduction. By July 2001, GAM has
exercised control over much of Aceh, with a particularly strong presence in six of the
most popular, and wealthiest districts, such as Pidie district (Human Rights Watch,
2001b).

At the same time, the security forces killed 41 people during October to
November 2000, while trying to prevent Acehnese from attending a second
SIRA-organized rally. By the end of 2000, Indonesian security forces in Aceh were
around 30,000 personnel, including 16,000 TNI troops (Huxley, 2002, p.38) .

With no discernable progress in the peace talks with the GAM and in the face of
strong public and military support for a firm government stance toward the Aceh
rebels (together with ExxonMobil temporarily halting production at Arun our
concern at the deteriorating security situation (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002)), Wahid
issued the Presidential Instruction Number 4 of April 11, 2001 under pressure. In
theory, the Instruction outlined a “comprehensive approach” to the security problem
in Aceh10, but, in practice, the main result of the Instruction was the restructuring of
the security apparatus responsible for Aceh, the structure of the security forces in
Aceh was reorganized, with the national police and the ar my commanded in Aceh
given equal responsibility for operations, which were conducted by the police, but
with full army support 11. By April 2001, the government had deployed some 25,000
troops to the region, with Kostrad units engaged in field operations and Kopassus
units providing intelligence support (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001). A New “Operation for
the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law” (OKPH) was formed, under the
overall supervision of the national mobile police brigade (Brimob) commander,
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Yusuf Manggabarani.

The increased military presence apparently sharpened the conflict, so intensified
operations have led to an escalation of violence since mid-2001; confidence-building
measures languished as the military campaign escalated. The discussion in July 2001
on establishing a bilateral ceasefire-supervision committee failed to make progress
and the police then arrested six negotiators (Human Rights Watch, 2001b).

This escalated violence included stepped-up attacks and massacres of Javanese
migrants by the GAM and executions of suspected GAM sympathizers and collective
punishments by the TNI and pro-Indonesian militias in retaliation for the GAM
attacks, just as what the Human Right Watch Report stated as below,

In June (2001), Central Aceh was the site of a particularly violent eruption with
the army claiming that GAM had massacred more than forty Javanese migrants
on June 5-6 in the areas of Bandar and Timang Gajah, and GAM claiming that
the TNI, together with a Javanese militia called Puja Kusuma, had massacred
even more ethnic Acehnese and Gayo people in retaliation in the weeks that
followed (Human Rights Watch, 2001b).

The intensity of the conflict could be measured by the number of causalities.
According to the information from the Indonesian Red Cross, some 150 people had
been confirmed dead between the first week of June and mid July; 800 homes had
been burned to the ground (Human Rights Watch, 2001b p.11).

When Megawati came to power in July 2001 after the fall of Wahid, she and her
government appeared to assign greater priority to solving Aceh’s problems; and was
prepared to take a pragmatic stance. In mid-August 2001, she apologized to the
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people of Aceh for the past policies, particularly human-right abuse s. In the same
month, she signed a law 12 granting wide-ranging autonomy to the province 13.
Although the legislation grants Aceh a much higher portion of the proceeds from the
province’s resources, the new law failed to impress most Achenese14; the GAM
continued to insist that it would accept nothing short of independence (Huxley, 2002 ,
pp.39-40). Just as when Wahid’s earlier efforts to conciliate the Acehnese had met
with little success, so Megawati’s government turned to a “security approach” to the
insurgency problem at the beginning of 2002. Jakarta announced that a separate
military area command (kodam) would be re-established in Aceh to control larger
numbers of permanently-based troops (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002) .

By the beginning of 2002, the TNI had succeeded in breaking up the GAM units
into isolated bands and in gradually pushing them off the north coast highway,
through central Aceh, and into the hills of Pidie district, and GAM appeared to be on
the defensive. On January 23, 2002, the military commander of GAM, Abdullah
Syafiie was killed in a gun battle with the security forces; the GAM suffered a major
blow (Huxley, 2002, pp.40-41). In February 2002, GAM accepted special autonomy
as a starting point for negotiations, and agreed to a new ceasefire and
confidence -building measures in advance of the 2004 provincial elections. The GAM
now is operating in smaller bands which are not under unified central control, active
in south and west coasts of Aceh.

Secessionist mo vement in Irian Jaya (Papua)

To certain extent, the case in Irian Jaya have some similarities between the case
in Aceh, although, relatively it has been far less violent than Aceh. However, the
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secessionist movement in Irian Jaya still act as a prolonged conflict between the
central government and the secessionists which can be dates back to the late 1940s early 1950s. When Indonesia’s independence was recognized in 1949, it was agreed
that the territorial status of what was then known as West New Guinea would be
determined in negotiations between Netherlands and Indonesia. However, in
December, 1961, an Indonesian politico-military campaign against continued Dutch
control provoked US diplomatic intervention (Huxley, 2002, pp.41-42). U ltimately,
sovereignty over the province was transferred to Indonesia under United Nations
auspices in 1963 with the proviso that so-called Act of Free Choice to be held in
1968 to determine if the inhabitants wished to be part of Indonesia (Human Rights
Watch, 2001a pp.7-9). In July to August 1969, Indonesian authorities arranged for the
Act of Free Choice in the form of consultations with 1026 electors 15 (selected tribal
leaders by the Indonesia government). Those electors confirmed the integration with
Indonesia without a formal vote (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.107). In November
1969, the UN General Assembly endorsed Indonesia’s incorporation of the territory.

Such a historical background on the incorporation of Irian Jaya provided a
fertile ground for the secessionist movement since the people in Irian Jaya were
prepared to having Independence due to their unique cultural, religious and historical
background which is different from Javanese. A very good indicator is the use of
“Morning Star” flag, a potent symbol of Papuan cultural and political aspirations.
Generally speaking, the base for the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya can be
summarized as below:

First, Irian Jaya was not part of the original Republic of Indonesia, and shares
few social or cultural characteristics with the rest of Indonesia. Most of the
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province’s two million inhabitants are Melanesians, who were ethnically distinct
from Indonesia ’s population and include many Christians (Rabasa and Chalk,
2001,pp.37-40; Human Rights Watch, 2001a pp.2-4, 7-9).

Second, there was dissatisfaction w ith Indonesian rule, including Jakarta’s
policies of encouraging migration from densely-populated regions, such as Java to
Irian Jaya and disregarding the local cultures and exploitating the province ’s natural
resources16 under terms that did not benefit the local population (Rabasa and Chalk,
2001,pp.37-40; Human Rights Watch, 2001a, pp.2-4, 7-9). These exacerbated the
indigenous population’s secessionism.

The above factors created the conditions for a low-intensity insurgency led by
the tribal- based OPM, which continued to launch small-scale attacks on Indonesia
troops. The insurgents have mostly staged relatively small-scale hit and run attacks
on Indonesian military posts, and, on a few occasions have taken hostages to draw
attention to their cause, but for most of the time, the OPM were practiced in the
forms of guerrilla activity. The OPM, reportedly has a hard core of some 200 fighters
(Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p38) , but unlike GAM, OPM received limited support
from across the border.

As in the case of Aceh, a “security approach” had been pursued in de aling with
the insurgency in Irian Jaya during the Suharto period. Guerrilla activities by the
OPM in the 1970s led to major Indonesian military operations in the Jayawijaya
highlands in 1977-1978; and in the Bela, Alama, Jila, and Mapenduma districts from
1996 to 1998. Violence was practiced by both sides (Human Rights Watch, 2001a,
pp.8-9). For example, for the case in Mapuduma district in 1996, after the OPM took
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hostage a group of young Indonesian and foreign scientists; hostage rescue operation
was practiced by the military and police, civilians were killed and arrested;
subsistence gardens and livestock were destroyed for the purpose of ensuing military
and police sweeps. The campaign went on for two years after the army mounted its
hostage rescue operation. Such kind of violence between the both sides plants the
seeds of distrust and future conflict. By the mid-1990s, however, OPM had been
reduced to the tribally-based bands operating close to the Papua New Guinea border.

The post-Suharto governments of Habibie, Wahid and Megawati followed an
approach of conciliation and repression in dealing with the secessionist movement in
Irian Jaya. Habibie initially made efforts to recognize and apologize for the human
rights violations committee under his predecessors. In February 1999, the Habibie
government endorsed a “national dialogue” on Irian Jaya with 100 provincial
representatives (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001, p.39); but the dialogue was suspended
when the province’s leaders demanded independence at a meeting with the president
in Jakarta. Security authorities launched a crackdown in the territory immediately.
Just like the case in Aceh, Jakarta’s response was to ban all discussion or
dissemination of information on independence or autonomy (.Rabasa and Chalk,
2001, p.39).

Wahid’s government also followed a similar approach to Habibie; it first tried a
conciliatory way, but ruled out any prospect of independence. Within this context,
Wahid’s government agreed to change the province name from Irian Jaya to Papua 17,
agreed to let the “Morning Star” flag be flown as long as it was flown below the
Indonesian flag. In addition, the new administration openly acknowledged the errors
of the past, allowing greater freedom and permitting the open, peaceful expression of
80

Chapter 5

pro-independence views; it released more than 60 Papuans from prison as part of a
nationwide amnesty for political prisoners (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, p.108).
Wahid also provided state funds for a Papuan congress---a provincial assembly called
the Great Consolation (Mubes) in 23-26 February 2000, at which for the first time,
Papuan popular representatives could gather together to air their concerns. However,
this congress created great pressure on Wahid and became embarrassing to him.

The reason is that as a result of the Mubes meeting, the Papuan Council
Presidium was established to lead the independence movement and the leading
personality in the movement and head of the Papuan Confess was Theys Eluay18. The
delegates adopted a resolution stating that the province’s incorporation into Indonesia
was illegal, and therefore null and void, and so West Papua (the delegates name for
the province) had been an independent state since 1961 (Human Rights Watch,
2001a). The congress also called on Jakarta to recognize the sovereignty and
independence of West Papua. It made Wahid immediately state that although his
government helped finance the event, it did not recognize the congress, and
considered it illegitimate since it had failed to represent all sectors of society in Irain
Jaya.

The Mubes meeting acte d as a catalyst to the secessionist movement in Irian
Jaya, and it created great pressure on Wahid’s more tolerant policies on that issue, so
that with the strengthening of pro-independence sentiment in the province, Jakarta
shifted to a harder line approach toward the secessionists. Immediately follow the
congress, the government interrogated key Presidium leaders and congress organizers.
After June 2000, thousands of new troops were sent to the province, bringing total
security-force numbers in the province to more the 10, 000 (Huxley, 2002, p.44).
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Tensions are high in the province and there is a tendency for the escalation in
violence. The case in Abepuard (December 2000), Wamena (October 2000), Betaf
(February 2001) and Wasior (June 2001) were good indicators of the increasing
violence by both sides, especially for the case in Wamena. In October 2000, joint
security forces clashed wit h independent supporters when the authorities attempted
to lower the “Morning Star” flag at a number of Satgas Papua 19 (Pro-independence
militia) posts in the Wamena area 20. 32 people were killed in the clashes. In response,
the Papuan mob began burning and looting shops; confronted by gunfire from
security forces, the mob went as a rampage, venting their anger in a residential area
that is home primarily to migrants from other pa rts of Indonesia. Satgas Pupua
members killed at least 28 non-Papuans in Wamena after police removed Morning
Star flags and killed several militiamen. Jakarta subsequently arrested more than 50
activists, including several leading members of the Papua Presidium, and the raising
of the Morning Star flag was banned after the Wamena incident (Human Rights
Watch, 2001a).

The military crackdown elicited an increasingly violent response from armed
Papuan groups during 2001; OPM forces stepped up operations, taking hostages and
attacking Indonesian troops. At the same time, Wahid’s government had drawn up
special-autonomy legislation, intended to undermine secessionist aspirations by
devolving substantial administrative and fiscal authority. The special autonomy law
that parliament approved in October 2001, took effect on 1 January 2002 21; however,
many secessionists still rejected autonomy and demanded a referendum on
independence (Huxley, 2002, pp.43-44).

As a whole, with the situation in early 2002, the prognosis for resolving the
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conflict in Irian Jaya was poor because the autonomy law seemed unlikely to assuage
pro-independence sentiment due to the incompatible goal between the two groups on
one hand; and on the other hand, there was no sign that OPM could achieve more
than “pin-prick” success in the face of Jakarta’s increasingly hard-line military
posture.

After looking to the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, we can now
move on to the second part of this chapter. In this part, the theoretical framework of
this thesis, the conflict cycle , will be put along with the findings to act as a guide to
the things that ha ve happened in Aceh and Irian Jaya. The case in Aceh will come
across first.

The application of the Conflict Cycle Model

Conflict cycle is a way, a concept or an idea in studying the “life” of a conflict;
how it emerges, escalates, de-escalates and then settled. It is assumed that conflicts
move thorough a series of stage s just like a cycle; and clearly have a beginning, a
middle and an end. It is clear that the secessionist movement in Aceh is a kind of
conflict, it is a conflict between the Indonesian government force (both the police
and the military) and the forces of GAM with an incompatible objectives. For the
Indonesian government force, their goal is to maintain the integration of the country;
and for the GAM, they want to establish an Independent Islamic State of Aceh.
Therefore, it will be appropriate in using the conflict cycle to illustrate the case in
Aceh.

In fact, the metaphor of a conflict going through a cycle is not quite appropriate
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or a little bit misleading in the case of Aceh. A conflict cycle is good in illustrating a
micro-conflict, for example just a unique fighting or violent event between two
groups, such as the events on attacking ExxonMobil facilities. If we want to analyse
the prolonged conflict in Aceh as a whole or in a more comprehensive and
macro-way, a conflict spiral will be more suitable. (See Figure 5.1) Actually, conflict
cycle is similar with conflict spiral, the two models contain the same stages,
suggest ing that conflict will go through these stages from the beginning to the end.
However, the difference between the two models is that, in the conflict cycle, it
seems that the end of a conflict may become the basis for a renewed struggle in a
short time. However, for sometimes, the end of a conflict is enduring, whatever the
temporary end. The conflict never returns to the same circumstances or intensify as
before the struggle began; surges and pauses in the struggle have their indelible
consequences. Therefore, a spiral is a more suitable image to simulate how a
prolonged conflict is operating by suggesting that each linked sweep (contained with
Base, Manifestation, Escalation, De -escalation and Termination) varying in the
degree of escalation and occurring in a different historical setting.
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Figure 5.1

Conflict Sprials
(Source: Kriesberg, 1998)

Starting from the first stage, Base, it is underlying condition that can become
source for an overt struggle, thus, in other words, it is the bases for the emergence of
a conflict. It included factors within one or more of the adversaries firing their
members to contend with others, as well as aspects of the relationship between
possible adversaries that tend to produce a sense of grievance and the formulation of
antagonistic goals. For the conflict in Aceh, the strong ethnic identity, culture and
religious background of the Achenese acting as the Base of the conflict at the initial
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stage since all these factors contribute a sense of grievance that the Indonesian
central government should not incorporate them as part of the Republic.

However, one thing we should be aware, is that the presence of the underlying
condition does not equal the emergence or manifestaction of the conflict. The
conditions for an infinite number of conflicts are always present; yet relatively few
conflicts become manifest, and even fewer become really a conflict. Therefore, the
second stage, Manifestation is very important in whether a conflict will emerge or
not.

A conflict is said to be manifest if four conditions are present. First, at least one
protagonists has a sense of its identity, distinguishing itself from other parties, second,
members of one or more of the adversary parties believe they are a grievance, some
aspect of their situation being unsatisfactory an unjustified. Third, members of one or
more sides, believing that their grievance would be reduced by a change wrought by
another person or group, formulate a goal to bring about the changes in the other side
so that their grievance will be reduced. Fourth, those asserting the goal must believe
that they can act to help attain it (Kriesberg, 1998). In fact, the underlying conditions
in the first stage, Base provide the foundation for the above four conditions to
emerge. A conflict has become manifest as those underlying conditions in the Base
change and become more conducive to the eruption of a struggle. In the case of Aceh,
the formation of GAM in 1976 was a good example of manifestations of the conflict,
since one side of the adversaries in the conflict expressed the four conditions on the
manifestation by mobilizing supporters and directly trying to affect the opposing side
so as to achieve their goal. As suggested by Kriesberg, there is no need for all the
adversaries to explicitly articula te the four conditions, if one side acts in these terms,
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the other side will likely see itself as engaged in a struggle (Kriesberg, 1998,
pp.58-92). So, since that time, the secessionist movement in Aceh has become a
manifested conflict.

After a conflict has become manifested, as times go, it will move on to the next
stage, Escalation. Conflict escalation generally refers to increases in the severity of
coercive inducements used and increases in the scope of participation within a
conflict. Increased severity of coercion includes greater threats as well as harsher
negative sanctions that actually impose , and increasing the scope of participation
generally refers to increases in the number of parties or peoples engaged in the
struggle. Change in these two dimensions often occur together as more people are
mobilized for a fight, they are able to take sides in the conflict to try to attain goals
by intensifying the means used in rallying support for its cause. In Aceh, as
mentioned in this chapter before, during the period of mid-1970s to mid-1980s, the
conflict was still in the stage of manifestation, but from the late 1980s, with the
assistance from Libya, the GAM began to escalate the conflict as making attacks on
military and police posts.

According to Kriesberg, three variables will governing the process of escalation
in a conflict, and they are, first, the internal change of development of each
adversaries second, the change in relations between adversaries or the Interaction of
the adversaries; third, the involvement of other parties in the conflict,. So, the main
reason behind the escalation in the late 1980s was due to the involvement of Libya in
the conflict, which help to change the balance of resources between the GAM and the
Indonesian government, thus, indirectly escalating the conflict. The better resources
in practicing more coercive means for the GAM make it believe themselves to be
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winning and overreaches itself, it gives little attention to the interests and concerns of
the opposing sides. This tends to stiffen the resistance of the opponents and increase
their sense of desperation. Intensifying the means by one side does make a change in
the relations between the adversaries. If one party is harmed or even threatened by a
rival, it is more likely to respond with hostility rather than acquiescence. That
hostility is then reciprocated, after which the parties may come to feel that revenge
and damaging the other side have become goals in themselves. So, it will be not hard
to explain why the Indonesian government side is using a military and
inhumane-way in response to the violent action by GAM. From now on, both sides
have taken a step up the escalation ladder that was not intended.

The hard-line approach on military suppression during the DOM period
(1990-1998) by the Indonesian government side had transited the conflict to the other
stage, that is De-escalation. The conflict at that time has temporarily de -escalated
because the GAM did not have enough ability to sustain resistance to the Indonesian
government. At that moment, the conflict in Aceh seemed to come to the end, and
reached the final stage of a conflict, Termination. However, although, de-escalation
refers to the decreases in the severity of the means used and/or in the number of
parties/ peoples engaged in the struggle; those decreases are not always a prelude to a
conflict’s ending (but when a conflict does end, de -escalation has generally preceded
it). In fact, as suggested by the Conflict Spiral model, the situation in Aceh during the
late 1990s ha d just come to the end of a sweep; but not the end of a conflict. The
conflict is still carried on as the termination of one sweep become s the base for a new
sweep. The in humane treatments during the DOM period, and the continuous
economic exploitation of the natural resources of Aceh became the base for another
way round of escalation of the conflict. Of course, the external factor of the change
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in leadership of the Indonesian government (the fall of Suharto) also provide with a
scenario for the conflict to be escalated again. But, for this time, as the conflict is
prolonged, the escalation has become more intensif ied and serious than before.

It will be not hard to explain such a change if we can follow the three variables
suggested by Kriesberg in studying the process of escalation.

First of all, as the conflict has been prolonged, there will be an internal change
to

the

development

of

the

adversaries

in

the

conflict

through

the

Social-Psychological processes and the Organizational Development. Under
social-psychological process, Cognitive dissonance theory, Entrapment and Selection
perception can be use to describe and explain on why the process of escalation has
changed as times going on.
Cognitive dissonance theory suggested that individuals seek consistency
between what they do and what they think they should do. Consequently, once
having committed an action, they seek to justify it in their own minds. As persons
expend resources to hurt or support injuring other humans, they tend to regard the
cause for which those actions were taken as more and more important. As the cause
becomes more valued, ever more harmful acts are justified. Entrapment also act as
the other factor in contributing to the conflict escalation. This concept refers to “a
decision making process whereby individuals escalate their commitment to a
previously chosen, though failing, course of action in order to justify or ‘make good
on’ prior investments” (Kriesberg, 1998, p.153). In addition, people always tend to
notice phenomenon that fit their expectation, and that is referred to as selective
perception. It also occurs in many ways that contribute to conflict escalation, for
example, once a struggle has entered a stage of mutual recrimination and
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contentiousness, even conciliatory conduct by the adversary is likely not to be
noticed or, if noticed, be discounted and considered deceptive (Kriesberg, 1998,
pp.150-157).

As in the case of Aceh, the social-psychological process did made changes to
both the GAM and the Indonesian government side; the effect of cognitive
dissonance and entrapment become more intensify as times goes on. The sense of
belonging to a larger entity engaged in a struggle provides meaning and significance
to the lives of those participants in the conflict; it also provided with a livelihood, a
sense of identity as well as a vehicle for power and influence, thus, the struggle itself
creates a vested interest for some people to continue the fight. This can help to
explain why the TNI still have a strong intention in using a hard-line approach on the
secessionist issue in Aceh. Moreover, the process of entrapment tends to lock some
people in the conflict into persisting in a course of action. A prolonging conflict
seems to justify what has already be en expended in honor, in blood. And that was the
case for some of the members of GAM. As time goes on, the unfavorable factors in
the conflict instead of being erased will accumulate , which makes it more difficult
for both sides in the conflict to escape from the process of escalation due to the effect
of the social-psychological process. In fact, this will also affect the organizational
developments of the adversaries as well. Since leaders generally represent their
constituents in conflicts with outsiders , they are predisposed to become identified
with the group’s already established oppositional goals and the means chosen to
pursue them, if the conflict cannot settle down within a short time, it will be prone to
becoming more entrapment for the leaders as well as the parties themselves since the
costs are particularly high for them to admit that the course of action being pursued is
a failure. Admitt ing that their conduct has been mistaken by the leaders and the
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parties may be regarded as acknowledging that the opponent’s course was correct,
and that may appear to be catering to the enemy. So, it will be not hard to understand
that why the leaders of GAM and Indonesian government side always have an
incompatible goal between them. As the conflict has prolonged, it will be more
difficult for either side to modify or change its goals, thus, more easily to result in
conflict escalation.

Secondly, beside the internal change to the adversaries within the conflict, as a
conflict erupts and becomes prolonged, the re will be changes in the relations between
adversaries as well, which also contribute to the escalation of conflict. The most
dangerous phenomenon within this aspect is the self -fulfilling prophecies by the two
sides in the conflict. It refers to the situation that as adversaries exchange contentious
behavior, each reasonably expects that the other will increase its pressure it is
prevented or deterred by greater coercion. It is dangerous because it makes hostility
become reciprocate. If one of the parties commits coercive acts, the other side will
respond in the same way. Take the case in Aceh. The GAM took a more violent
approach in the late 1990s due to the inhumane treatment by the TNI during the
DOM period; the inhumane treatment deepens the antagonism and the desire to
continue the struggle or even to seek revenge by both sides. President Instruction
Number 4 by Wahid is a good example of the reciproc ity in hostility. In addition, as
the conflict emerges, develops and escalate, the adversaries tend to become
increasingly isolated from each other, which reduce the opportunities in
communication, this is also part of the reasons of why the humanitarian pause finally
failed.

Besides the changes in internal development among the adversaries and the
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interaction or relations between the two sides in the conflict, the involvement of
other parties also contributes to the conflict escalation. The assistance from the
Acehnese businessman in the 1990s was one of the factors for the more coercive type
of behavior by the GAM in late 1990s.

Generally speaking, after the fall of Suharto in late 1990s, the secessionist
movement in Aceh has entered into a new sweep of the conflict, the Termination
stage in the previous sweep becomes the Base for the new sweep under the model of
conflict spiral. For most of the time in the post-Suharto period, at least until the early
2002, the conflict in Aceh was in the stage of escalation. Although, it seems that
there were some non-coercive measures, like dialogue and political concessions in
dealing with the conflict, it still did not reach the stage of de-escalation since the
three aspects needed for de-escalation have not changed during this period. Instead,
as explained in the previous paragraphs, the process of escalation has been more
intensif ied as the conflict is prolonged The effect of selective perception is so large
that the conciliatory conduct by the Indonesian government side is not likely to be
noticed by the GAM. The situation becomes even worse for, as one of the parties
makes a conciliatory gesture or responds less aggressively than anticipated, the other
may interpret that as a sign of weakness. The weakness, however, serves as an
invitation to escalate demands and pressure. This can explain the phenomenon of an
inc onsistent approach on suppression and conciliation by the Indonesian government
and finally fosters the conflict into the stage of De-escalation at the early 2002. The
military action by the TNI under the Megawati administration has weakened the
ability of the GAM to sustain the resistance, which make s a change in the relations
between the adversaries. Moreover, the death of Abdullah Syafiie that brought
change to the internal development of GAM; a new way of thinking may have a
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chance to appear since Abdullah Syafiie represented the more radical approach of
GAM in the past.

Since that time, the secessionist movement in Aceh has been moved to the stage
of Termination again. The second sweep within the conflict have just temporarily
ended. However, it may become the Base for the new sweep again in the future,
therefore, the secessionist movement in Aceh as a conflict will still be carried on.

For the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya, it also quite similar to the case in
Aceh. It can also be defined as a conflict between the secessionists (basically the
OPM and the community leaders in Irian Jaya) and the Indonesian government side;
with an incompatible goal among each other. The secessionists aim at independence
from the Republic of Indonesia , while the central government tries to maintain the
integrity of the country.

We can make analysis of the secessionist movement in Irian Jaya also with the
guiding of the Conflict Cycle model. Again, as in the case of Irian Jaya, the conflict
spiral may be more appropriate in illustrating the situation there since the
secessionist movement is still continuing nowadays.

The Base for the conflict in Irian Jaya was related to the historical background
of this place, as mentioned in this chapter before. Basically, the underlying
conditions for the conflict to emerge were the difference in ethnicity of Irain Jaya
with the rest of Indonesian (mainly Javanese) together with the dissatisfaction with
the Indonesian rule.
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The conflict become manifest or in other words, the conflict arises as those
underlying conditions change and become more conducive to the eruption of a
struggle . When the OPM was formed in 1970s, the four elements of manifestation
becomes apparent as the supporters in achieving their goal.

The conflict had become escalated since the OPM began to carry out attacks on
Indonesian posts and practiced the forms of guerrilla activity during the 1970s. Due
to the self -fulfilling prophecies, in responding to the more coercive action by the
OPM, the Indonesian government under Suharto began a hard-line approach in
dealing with the conflict. The escalated action by the OPM lead to the more coercive
action by the Indonesian government side.

Basically, with the unsymmetrical military ability between the two parties, the
conflict soon entered the stage of de-escalation as the military campaign by the
Indonesian government side change d the relations between the adversaries. The
ability to sustain resistance to the other side by the OPM has been weakening. The
conflict in Irian Jaya had been moved to the stage of Termination as by the
mid-1990s; the conflict seemed to cool down temporarily.

So, the conflict in Irian Jaya had been completed one sweep as suggested by the
conflict spiral during the Sukarno and Suharto period. The conflict is still carrying on
in the post-Suharto period, with the termination in the previous sweep (the coercive
elements done by TNI, such as the case in Mapuduma district) becoming the base for
a new sweep in the conflict spiral, just similar to the case in Aceh.

The level of the escalation in the new sweep becomes more intensif ied due to
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the change s in the internal development of each party in the conflict by the effect of
entrapment as well as the cognitive dissonance. As time goes on, more coercive
elements were be ginning to accumulate, so it makes it difficult for both parties to
escape from the escalation ladder. This can help to explain the happening of the case
in Wamena, when the Indonesian government side escalate d the conflict by
interrogating key Presidium leaders and congress organizers after the Mubes meeting,
as well as the increasing troops present in Irian Jaya. Just a minor action of lower ing
the “Morning Star” flag by the central government was view ed as a serious action by
the secessionists and triggered out a violent event.

However, the case in Irian Jaya contained some differences from the one in
Aceh. Generally speaking, the GAM received more support and assistance from
other external parties than the OPM. This will affect the Internal development of the
groups during the process of escalation; the result will be shown in the different level
of coercive activities. Thus, OPM conducted less coercive activities in comparison
with the GAM. The less violent performance by the OPM make s the stage of
escalation not so explicit, thus the stage of escalation and de -escalation was not so
clearly cut in the second sweep of conflict spiral of the case in Irain Jaya. Escalation
and de-escalation seems to occurr at the same time during the post-Suharto period;
they were linked by ‘anticipation’ and ‘feedback’. “Anticipation” refers to the
matters of conjecture, each adversary in the conflict tries to influence the other’s
views about what will happen if the other side takes particular steps. “Feedback”
refers to those experience or information that have received within one stage of the
conflict affects ongoing conduct in the same and the previous stage of conflict
(Kriesberg, 1998, pp.339-371). In other words, earlier decisions and actions are
reinterpreted in the light of new experiences and these new interpretation impact on
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future conduct. The conciliatory approach to the conflicts in Irian Jaya by the central
government during the post-Suharto period, such as the permission for flying the
“Morning Star” flag and the support in the Mubes meeting, seems to transited the
conflict into the stage of de -escalation since the Indonesian government side seemed
to be weakening in its resolve to sustain the resistance. Such a wrong perception was
received by the secessionists in Irian Jaya as “Anticipation” and “Feedback”, which
made them reinterpret their position and strategy again since the Indonesian
government side now treated them more humanely than they have anticipated.
Therefore, this can explain why delegates in the Mubes meeting have raised out such
a radical statement. Their wrong interpretation soon become the seeds for the
escalation on the conflict later on. Thus, the conflict in Irian Jaya during the
post-Suharto period was in between the stage of de -escalation and escalation because
future stages of conflict affected the earlier ones through the backward linkage of
“anticipation” and “feedback”.

The conflict in Irian Jaya nowadays has still not yet reached to the stage of
Termina tion because neither side has shown weakening resolve in sustain ing the
resistance or trying to abandon the goal. The secessionist movement in Irian Jaya is
still in between the stage of escalation and de-escalation within the second sweep in
the model of conflict spiral.

The conflict cycle model can act as a framework in guiding us to see how a
conflict is actually carried on through out different stages; its provide information for
us on how a conflict is being shape by other factor. However, the more interesting
question for the secessionist movements in Indonesia is does terrorism exist in the
secessionist movements?
96

Chapter 5

Terrorism is a kind of strategy for the contending party to attain its goals once
the conflict has became manifested; in other words, strategy is a means for the
contending parties towards a desired goal. Therefore it will be interesting for us to
study what kinds of factor are governing the choice of the conflict strategies. But
before going in depth into this question, we should come across the nature of
terrorism as a conflict strategy first; and then analysis will be given to the case in
Aceh and Irian Jaya to see whether the conflicts there already contain terrorism.

As suggested by Kriesberg, the differences between different conflict strategies
are in terms of three basic inducements, which is coercion, reward and persuasion
(Kriesberg, 1998, p101). Terrorism is a conflict strategy with highly coercive
inducement. “It aims to intimidate others, whether to force them to yield power or to
conform to the power of authorities.” (Kriesberg, 1998, p114). Therefore, did the
conflicts in Aceh and Iria n Jaya have such a high coercive inducement element?

Existence of Terrorism in Secessionist Threats

From my point of view, terrorism has alr eady existed in the secessionist
movements in Aceh and Irain Jaya. It is because the practices of the secessionists had
clearly demonstrated the elements of terrorism which stated in chapter one.

Take the example in Aceh, where the attacks on military and police posts in
1989, the attacks on Exxon Mobil facilities in 1998, the hijacking of the company’s
vehicles, included buses which were carrying employees, during the late 1990s, and
the ethnic expulsion on non-Acehenese through massacre and destroying their
properties in early 2000s by the GAM can reflect the presence of terrorism in the
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secessionist movement. All the above events can be contained within the six
elements of terrorism (refer to chapter one). For example, in the attacks on Exxon
Mobil facilities and the hijacked company buses, the GAM members clearly
demonstrated their purpose in creating and instill fear to a wider “target audience”
(the government side). Before the action, the GAM members were clear that the
psychological effects would be much more crucial than the immediate effects to the
victims(s) or object(s), therefore, not many people were hurt during these events.
They just wanted to create fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit
for power on influence on politica l change (an independent Aceh). In addition, the
case in Lhoksari village, West Aceh on May 2001 was also a good example of
terrorist attack by the GAM. This attack truly reflects the threat of violence through
the creation and exploitation of fear. It is because after burning six houses of
Javanese in this village, the GAM members had ordered all Javanese to leave within
three days or they would be killed, one by one. It is not an ordinary criminal event
since it had conveyed with a “message” and the psychological effect is far reaching
beyond the incident itself or the immediate victim(s).

For the cases in Irian Jaya, it is also quite similar to the cases in Aceh, the
Wamena incident is also a good example of the presence of terrorism in the
secessionist movement (for details, please refer to previous pages).

Generally speaking, I would argue that terrorism was coexisted with the
secessionist movement as the strategy adopted by the secessionists in achieving for
their goals. It is still in the type as “traditional” terrorism in terms of the nature of the
groups (for GAM and OPM, they are relatively more cohesive in structure with
defined set of political objectives); level of lethality (relatively low except recently)
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and the practice of claiming credit for attacks.

However, as the process of escalation is carried on in both the cases of Aceh and
Irian Jaya, more and more coercive inducements will accumulate and present in the
conflict. There will be a greater tendenc y for New Terrorism to be transform as the
conflict strategy. A very good indicator was the case in Lhoksari village on May 2001
in West Aceh and the case in Wamena on October 2000 in Irian Jaya. These two
cases happened in nearly the same time frame and the level of violence has been
increased in relative to the case before, which induced an increase in lethality (one
feature of New Terrorism). The target or the casualties for this time included more
innocent personnel, which are not well targeted (the security force) as before. The
implication behind this phenomenon is that the objectives of the secessionist groups
become more amorphous than before, which is one feature of New Terrorism.

So, we have come to the other question here, that is, what kind of factors in
governing the contending parties in adopting the different conflict strategies? Why
sometimes is there a greater tendency for the adversaries to choose a more coercive
mode of strategy?

As suggested by Kriesberg, the goal(s) of the contending parties, the resources
of the adversaries and the social context behind the conflict all contribute in shaping
out the strategy that the adversaries will adopt. F irst of all, Kriesberg stated that “The
greater the perceived incompatibility of the goals in a consensual conflict, the greater
the tendency for the adversaries to choose conflict modes with major coercive and
even violent components”. (Kriesberg, 1998, p125).. The goal(s) for the secessionists
in Aceh and Irian Jaya and the Indonesian government side is clearly an example of
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high incompatibility in goal(s). Second, resources are a critical factor in governing
the adversaries in choosing the conflict strategies. An asymmetric balance of
resources between the two sides in a conflict may foster the coercive and violent
component. It is because with such a resources pattern, the dominant group (the one
which has more resources) tends to overestimate its own ability and gives little
attention to the interests and concerns of the opposing side. Thus, the resistance of
the opposing side will be intensified. In order to win the game under such a situation,
the opposing party may adopt a conflict strategy which can maximize the cost for the
dominant group. (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.132-139, 343-345). “This is often the rationale
used by the challe nging party for resorting to violence, even terrorism.” (Kriesberg,
1998, p344). The GAM, OPM and the Indonesian government side were in such an
asymmetric resources pattern. Finally, the social context behind the conflict provided
norms and prevailing ways of thinking to the members of the social system. The
contending parties are also members of the social system which share general
understandings about what are the appropriate means to be used in pursuing and
settling conflicts; this will constrain the adversaries’ choice of conflict strategy
(Kriesberg, 1998, p.141). If there is a change in the social context, such as the
emergence of New Terrorism in Indonesia (refer to chapter four), the conventional
norms or understand towards the conflict strategy will also be affected; the barriers in
the past may be crossed and a much higher level of antagonism may be reached and
sustained.

The above factors serve well in explaining why the adversaries in a conflict will
adopt a conflict strategy with coercive inducement; but it still does not point out why
terrorism will have a strong tendency to be adopted as the conflict strategy among
the other kinds of coercive strategy. Martha Crenshaw has suggested two reasons as
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the direct cause for the emergence of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981).

The first one is the “existence of concrete grievances among on identifiable
subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by
the majority” (Whittaker, 2001, p.15). A social movement is then develo ped with the
aims of redressing these grievances and gain either equal rights on a separate state;
terrorism is then the resort of an extremist faction of this broader movement.

The second one is the “lack of opportunity for political participation”
(Whittaker, 2001, p.16). The dominant regime that denies access to power for the
subordinate regime and persecutes dissenters will create dissatisfaction that cannot
be diverted by other proper and legal means, for example, the legal expression of
sound opposition. Terrorism may become the way for releasing the dissatisfaction.

In referring to the secessionist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, they matched
with the conditions suggested by Martha Crenshaw. Therefore, it is predicted that the
secessionist movements in these two places will be moving towards a more coercive
way of strategy and with a higher tendency to be emerging as a form of terrorism.

Why difficult to tackle

Secessionist movements is one of the most serious threats to the national
security of Indonesia, for over 50 years, and the Indonesian government has still not
yet completely settle d down this security threat due to the incompatible goals
between the secessionists and the Indonesian government. It seems that there is no
room for both sides in the conflict to have a compromise with each other. It is
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because for the Indonesian government side, it still ha s a strong view that if it lets
one of the provinces in the country separate, the whole Republic of Indonesia will
disintegrate, and, for the secessionists, they just try to achieve nothing but
independence.

The other factor which make s it difficult for the Indonesia n government in
tackling the secessionist movements is the influence of TNI. As mentioned in chapter
three, the TNI see the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya as “projects” were “money is
made, reputations are built and promotions gainer” (Huxley, 2002, p.45). Because of
such an interest the army hold s a strong position against the secessionists which will
contribute to the escalation of the conflict. In fact, the poor performance of the army
acts as a barrier to the de -escalation of the conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya, just as
Rabasa and Chalk have stated:

Economic exploitation would probably not have been strong enough to
generate overt separatist sentiments, for much of the 1980s, GAM
experience relatively little popular support, with most Achenese merely
calling for more autonomy and control over natural resources. It was only
during the last decade that these sentiments began to change, largely as a
result of anger generated by military excesses (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001,
p.33)

Conclusion

To conclude, the secessionist movements in Aceh and Iria n Jaya still act as a
threat to the national security of Indonesia due to the increasing level in violence or
coercive elements in the conflicts. In addition, the higher tendency for terrorism to be
present as a strategy in the conflict could even make the situation become more
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worse. Although the conflicts now seem to be temporarily settled down, as suggested
by the conflict cycle model, it has just completed one sweep; the conflict will still
carry on.

Notes
1

Darul Islam (literally House of Islam) is the name given to a rebellion that was launched on western
Java in 1948 and that continued until the 1960s. The revolt was sparked after Islamic rebels refused to
recognize the authority of the Indonesian state after the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949
and spread from Java to north Sumatra and south Sulawesi during the 1950s.
2
Acehnese historian IsaSulaiman estimated that 500 to 750 Acehnese were trained in Libya in the
late 1980s.
3
F or example, around one million Acehnese support the Independence rally in Banda, the provincial
capital in Aceh, which was the largest single demonstration of public sentiment in Indonesian history.
4 Indonesian intelligence sources put GAM ’s current armed membership at between 500 and 800.
5
Indonesian intelligence officials suspect that most of the weapons are smuggled from abroad,
principally from Cambodia, via the Thai-Malaysian border area while Aceh rebels claim that many of
their weapons are procured directly from soldiers and police desperate to supplement poor pay.
6
President Habibie went to Banda, Aceh on March 1999 for the apology for past abuse in Aceh
7
. President Habibie announced on January 27, 1999 that East Timorese would be given the
opportunity to choose between increased autonomy and separation from Indonesia.
8
In the first months after the pause took effect, violence declined sharply. As violations by the
Indonesian side increased, however, attacks by GAM on military and police also escalated.
9
T he measures like “special autonomy ” legislation and Telephone hotline between GAM and TNI
commanders.
10
T he instruction stated that efforts at resolving the conflict through dialogue with “armed
separatists” had produced no results and that violence on the part of the latter were increasing. The
government had therefore decided to adopt a more comprehensive approach, and to address the
political, economic, social, law and order, security, and information and communication aspects of the
problem.
11
A new “Operation for the Restoration of Security and Upholding the Law ” (OKPH) was formed
under the overall supervision of the national mobile police brigade (Brimob) commander, Yusuf
Manggabarani. Aceh’s chief of police, Chairul Rasjid; and army commander, Zamroni, were given
equal responsibility for command of the operations, which were envisioned as being under police
authority, but with full army back -up.
12
Law No.18 2001
13
The details were: First, the provincial government’s share of oil and gas revenues would increase
from 5% to 70%; second, there would be direct elections for the provincial governorship and other
local-government posts; third, the governor would possess veto rights over senior military
appointments in Aceh; and, fourth, the provincial government would be allowed to introduce elements
of sharia law.
14
Indeed, GAM’s control of r ural areas seemed likely to delay or even prevent the implementation of
many of the new law ’s provisions.
15
T hey were largely hand-picked by Jakarta and constituting far less than 1% of the Papuan
population at the time.
16
Irian Jaya contains a significant share of the country’s natural resources, including the world’s
largest gold and copper mining operation. This area also has one of the largest gas fields.
17
Irian Jaya, the name it was given after the Indonesian annexation. T he name of Papua was finally
bestowed officially with the state of regional autonomy on January 2002.
18
A traditional chief who had served as a Golkar member of the provincial parliament.
19
Satgas Papuan was initially formed in the Jayapura area to provide security for the Mubes and
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congress. In many cases the Satagas Papua units served as an outlet for expression of Papuan pride; in
others, however, members turned to gangsterism, intimidation, and extortion, often targeting small
business run by migrants.
20
Wamena, the capital of the Jayawijaya district with a population of just over 100,000, is the largest
town in the central highlands of Papua.
21
T he special autonomy law allocates the province 80% of revenue from forestry and fisheries and
70% from oil, gas and mining, provides for a Papua people’s council to protect the rights of
indigenous inhabitants; and confirm the change of name to Papua.
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Chapter Six
Ideological Challenge from Islam

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation with over 85% of the
population adhering to Islam. With such a background, it might be assumed that
Indonesia should be in the form of an Islamic state. However, in 1953, Sukarno
gave his rationale for making Indonesia as a secular state by saying that, “If we
establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic, will
secede”. (Wee, 2002, p.5). Suharto followed the same rationale during his New
Order administration. As mentioned in chapter three, in order to keep the newly
independent state in a unitary form, Pancasila was entrenched as the state
philosophy, effectively eclipsing the alternative vision of Indonesia as an Islamic
state, or even as a state where Muslims were subject to Sharia law. This situation
continued until the fall down of Suharto in 1998. But since the relaxation of
political constraints after 1998, Muslim political movements have proliferated
and expanded, and some have challenged the secular basis of Indonesia’s
statehood, acting as a threat to the national security of Indonesia.

In this chapter, the main focus will be on the ideological challenge by Islam,
which has been defined as one of the security threats to Indonesia under the
Post-Suharto period. In fact, the nature of this security threat is a tension between
strictly observant Muslims seeking a more Islamic form of governance and
moderate Muslims or new Muslims who prefer the secular status quo. This
tension has challenged the social and political stability of Indonesia, with
significant implications for national cohesion. Unlike the secessionist threats that
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have been mentioned in the previous chapter, the ideological challenge by Islam
will be divided into two aspects for the convenience in analysis. It is because
although this security threat or conflict contained the same elements in terms of
nature, there were different goals for the different groups involved in it. The main
distinction comes from the ultimate aim of what Indonesia should be. For one
side, they want to keep Indonesia as a unitary state, such as the practice of Laskar
Jihad (LJ). However, for the other side, they want to make Indonesia as part of a
larger Islamic state which encompassing other Islamic areas, such as Malaysia,
Philippines and Singapore; this was the aim for JI. Although the nature of the
conflict for both sides was the same, namely trying to challenge the secular status
of Indonesia, but unlike the secessionist threats (contained with the same goal in
separate form from Indonesia), this conflict contains different aims by different
groups. Therefore, in this chapter, we will first focus on the conflicts associated
with LJ and then on the ideological challenge brought by JI. Similar to the
structure of chapter five, a brief description will be given on the cases first,
followed by an application of the conflict cycle model to the findings. After that,
we will examine whether terrorism is present in the conflicts already. Finally, a
discussion will be provided on how difficult it is for the Jakarta government in
tackling it.

The case of Laskar Jihad

Laskar Jihad (LJ) was established in January 2000 by Jafar Umar Thalib, a
young religious teacher who had once fought in Afghanistan 1. The aim of
founding LJ was strongly related to the communal conflict in Maluku, in which
Thalib wanted to protect the victimized Muslim community and fight against the
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Christians (described as Kafir harbi, which is belligerent infidels) by declaring a
Jihad after the outbreak of the conflict in Muluku. Thalib was a hard-line Muslim
leader with a strong will to establish on Islamic state; he has once said that, “We
don’t like Pancasila because it means that Islam is the same as other religions.
This is not so. We believe that Islam is the highest religion and the best.” (Abuza,
2003, p.69) Therefore, LJ was a radical militiant Muslim group. The aim of this
group is try to recruit Muslims militants to wage jihad in Maluku and Sulawesi
and they believe that Indonesian Muslims are required to defend Islam against
unbelievers by means of jihad2 (Abuza, 2003 ,pp.69-72; Rabasa and Haseman,
2002, pp.84-87). Since there was a strong linkage between LJ and the communal
conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi, it will be worth while for us to go through the
conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi first.

Communal conflict in Maluku

There were several roots for the emergence of this conflict, but basically, as
Crouch has defined it, it was an inter-communal conflict between the Muslims
and Christians due to a combination of causes (Crouch, 2002). The change in
demographic composition 3 brought by the transmigration programme and
spontaneous in-migration, together with a higher birth-rate of the Muslims, has
changed the demographic composition from almost exact balance between
Muslims and Christians in 1991 to Muslims constituting 57% of the population.
With such a background, Muslims increasingly dominated the provincial
bureaucracy, holding three-quarters of the top 38 posts by 1999 (Huxley, 2002
pp.56-57). As the educational level of the Muslims improved, they began to
compete for the jobs within the bureaucracy and in the professions that had
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historically been dominated by Christians. The economic downturn after 1998
even intensified the competition. Besides the economic competition among the
two groups, the decentralization policy offered by the central government
together with the power vacuum created by the fall down of Suharto has
heightened political competition for control of local natural resources, budgets
and patronage, which in turn fosters the antagonism between the Christians and
Muslims.

All the above factors contributed to the outbreak of conflict in Ambon,
central Maluku in January 1999, which was triggered by an altercation between a
Christian bus driver and two Muslim passengers at the Ambon bus terminal.
Fighting spread widely to neighboring islands in central and southeast Maluku
(Rabasa and Haseman, 2002, pp.91-94), and later spread to northern Halmahera
in north Maluku.

Violence escalated from some small fight or riots between the two groups to
the massacre of at least 500 members of the Muslim minority in the Tobelo
district in Halmahera in December 1999 4. This atrocity against Muslims induced
revenge attacks on Christians remaining in northern Hulmahera by local militant
Islamic group. In one such attack in June 2000, 4000 –5000 Muslim fighters
rampaged through a Christian settlement, killing more than 100 villagers.

The conflicts became more intensified after the presence of LJ in May 2000.
The arrival of 6000 well-armed members of LJ from Java changed the balance of
power, and Christians found themselves on the defensive. from the second half of
2000 until the end of 2001, the conflicts in Ambon were shaped into an
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occupation of discrete areas within the city by the two groups, with Christians
occupying one end of the town and Muslims the other. In March 2001, Thalib
declared the establishment of Islamic law in the Malukus (Abuza, 2003,
pp.70-71). There were still some fights, bombings and shootings during this
period, especially at the end of 2001. In February 2002, government-sponsored
peace talks resulted in the two sides agreeing to end their violence and surrender
their weapons. However, renewed violence in April 2002 not only threatened to
undermine this settlement, but also prompted the government to arrest the leaders
of LJ and the Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM) 5. The government also vowed to
expel LJ’s remaining forces from Maluku and to disband the FKM. Up to this
moment, the communal conflicts in Maluku seem to have come to an end; this
conflict has left around 10000 people dead and created 500,000 refugees in a
population of 2.4 million (Huxley, 2002 ,p.56).

Communal Conflict in Sulawesi

Beside the conflict in Maluku, a similar case has occurred in Poso district in
the central Sulawesi. The roots of the conflict were almost the same as the one in
Maluku, which is the influx of Muslims from other islands changing the ethnic
and religious make up of the region which triggered economic and political
competition between the Muslims and Christians in an area which had been
dominated by Christians before; for example the competition to be bupati
(district head) and sekwilda (district secretary). This imposed a power
distribution in the district administration (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.6-10 ).

The conflict in Poso first emerged in December 1998 with a fight between a
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Christian and a Muslim, but was finally controlled by local officials and without
spreading (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp14-15). However, large scale violence
between Muslims and Christians broke out in April 2000; after a brawl between a
Christian and a Muslim youth from Lombogia and Kayamanya and Sayo (A
Muslim youth claimed to have been attacked by Christians, and showed cuts on
his arm as proof). Violence spread out this time for several days after the brawl,
with angry Muslims attacking Lombogia (a Protestant neighborhood) and
burning houses, churches and schools. Several Christians were reportedly pulled
from cars and killed. During this period, the two sides began to use colored
headbands and armbands to distinguish themselves. The Christians fighters
became known as the red group and the Muslims as white group. To conclude,
the first stage of the conflict was attacks by Muslims on Christians.

The second stage of the conflict just started three weeks after the end of the
first stage, dominated by a wave of retaliatory attacks by Christians on Muslims.
There were direct clashes between the red group and white group, but also the
kidnapping and killing of non-combatants during this period, for example, the
case in Sintuwu Lemba village (Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.17-20). On May
28, 2000, a group of Christians surrounded this village and attacked it. Many
villagers were killed by guns and machetes, whether or not they surrendered;
women and children were captured and some women even being sexually
assaulted. 39 bodies were later discovered in three mass graves. The attack on
Sintuwu Lemba village was just one example of the serial attacks made by
Christians, for they also attacked the villages of transmigrates from Lombok and
Java in a similar way.
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The conflict took a new turn in July 2001 with the involvement of LJ in the
conflict. As the Human Right Watch Report stated that “The continued failure of
a series of military and police operations to prevent violence or hold perpetrators
accountable opened the door to the arrival of the radical Muslim group Laskar
Jihad” (Human Rights Watch, 2002 p.20). LJ declared a jihad in Poso and began
to dispatch hundreds of fighters to the district. The LJ and Muslim irregulars
launched a scorched-earth campaign, destroying dozens of Christian villages, for
example, the Sepe village, the villages in Pinedapa, Sayo and Kayamanya
(Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.25-27). During the days of late November and
early December 2001, eight villages in Poso Pesisir and Lage subdistricts were
largely burnt to the ground6; nine to fifteen dead and thousands fled to the
mountain towns of Napu and Tentena. The LJ members were well-armed with
automatic weapons. 7 The situation became more stabilized after the central
government sent two battalions of soldiers and police to Tentena. There were
rumors of a full-scale attack on Tentena (Protestant center) by LJ which raised
the international awareness of this issue since the international community
believed that Al-Qaeda may be seeking for such a chaotic conditions in Indonesia
(Human Rights Watch, 2002 pp.27-28). Due to such external pressure, a Security
Restoration Operation was launched with the aim in restoring peace in Sulawesi.

The conflicts in Sulawesi seems to have come to an end with the negotiation
between representatives of the Muslim and Christian sides in a hill town called
Malino, in South Sulawesi. The negotiation was presided over by officials from
Jakarta 8 . After the talks on December 19-20, 2001, a ten point Malino
Declaration 9was drawn up and temporarily ended the hostilities. 1000 people
had been killed and 80,000 displaced in this conflict.
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The application of the Conflict Cycle Model

In referring to the definition of conflict in chapter one, it is clear that the
inter-communal antagonistic activities in Maluku and Sulawesi can be defined as
a kind of conflict. It is a conflict between the Christians (the original settlers) and
the Muslims (the transmigrants from other part of Indonesia) with incompatible
objectives in struggling for the economic resource and political power
distribution at the very beginning. Later on, with the involvement of LJ in the
conflicts, the nature of the conflict began to transform as a tension grew between
Muslims and non-Muslims as to whether Maluku and Sulawesi should be in the
form as an Islamic state governed by Sharia or remain as a secular state.

Having identified the cases in Malaku and Sulawesi as a kind of conflict, the
conflict cycle model can be used as a guide in illustrating the findings on Maluku
and Sulawesi. However, there is difference from the previous chapter. Since the
conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi appeared quite recently, not like those
prolonged conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya, therefore, the conflict cycle will be
more appropriate than the conflict spiral in illustrating the communal conflicts.
The conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi also go through the stages from Base to
Manifestation, and then Escalation, De-escalation and finally reach
Termination.

The Base for the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi were quite similar,
generally speaking, the accumulation of religious, ethnic make -up, economic and
political factors act as the underlying conditions for an overt struggle, which can
fire the adversarial relationship; one side to contend with others. As stated in the
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previous chapter, the presence of underlying condition does not equal the
emergence of the conflict. The stage of Manifestation is important in studying the
“life” of a conflict because whether a conflict will occur or not depends on this
stage.

For the cases in Maluku and Sulawesi, it was quite interesting that the stage
of Manifestation in the both cases were triggered out by an apparently trivial
incident. For the case in Maluku, it was an altercation between a Christian bus
driver and two Muslim passengers and for the case in Sulawesi, it was a brawl
between a Muslim and a Christian. The underlying conditions in the first stage,
Base, provided the foundation for the four necessary conditions for a conflict to
become manifest (please refer to chapter one and five). These seemingly trivial
events act as a catalyst that changes the underlying condition in the first stage to
become more conducive to the eruption of a struggle. The altercation of the bus
driver in Maluku and the brawl in Sulawesi can exploit the four conditions of
manifestation and act as an excuse. Or act as a factor for the contending parties
(Muslims and Christians) to mobilize supporters and directly try to affect the
opposing side, so as to achieve their goal. Therefore, the conflicts in Muluku and
Sulawesi became manifested after these two trivial incidents in January 1999 and
April 2000 respectively.

Once a conflict became manifested, as time passes, with the increases in the
severity of coercive inducements used and in the scope of participation within a
conflict, the conflict has said to be transferred to another stage, the Escalation
stage. For the case in Maluku, the process of escalation took place around
December 1999 as demonstrated in the Tobelo massacre. The communal conflict
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in Maluku was in the stage of escala tion only until April 2002. In Sulawesi, the
conflict escalated only from the brawl in April 2000 until December 2001. A very
good indicator for the escalation is that the contending parties began to
distinguish themselves by colors; at this period, it was symbolic of a more
“mature” approach to in mobilizing the members for a fight to attain the goals. In
fact, the level of violence had been increasing through out the process of
escalation in both cases. Starting with some limited small fighting or antagonistic
activities and then became massacres and burning of property of the opposite
group in the conflict. The change in the targets from combatants to
non-combatants in the conflicts can also reflect the increased level of coercive
elements.

As stated in chapter five, the internal change in the adversaries, the change
in relations between adversaries and the involvement of other parties in the
conflict will governing the process of escalation in a conflict. The presence of LJ
in the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi at May 2000 and July 2001 was one of
the major factor in escalating the conflicts. The Human Right Watch Report
states that, “there has been a great deal made of the role of Laskar Jihad in
exacerbating conflicts in Maluku and elsewhere, and our research confirms that
Laskar Jihad’s presence helped fuel conflict in Poso” (Human Rights Watch,
2002 p.2). With the involvement of LJ in the conflicts, on one hand, it had
changed the balance of resources between the Muslims and Christians in both the
numbers of fighters and types of weapons. The better resources for the Muslim
side in practicing more coercive means will intensifying the conflict because it
makes them believe themselves to be winning and so overreach themselves; thus,
they give little attention to the interests and concerns of the opposing sides. This
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will polarize the relationship between the adversaries in the conflict. The
contending parties tend to become increasingly isolated from each other.
Members of each camp, with little contradiction, tend to reinforce each other’s
negative stereotypes of the adversary, so further dehumanizing the enemy
(Kriesberg, 1998, pp.159-160). Self-fulfilling prophecies will occur under this
situation and the hostility becomes reciprocated. In the cases of Maluku and
Sulawesi, the patterns of conflict were quite similar with violence started by one
side first; and then the other side will respond in the same way. For example, it is
clear that the conflict in Sulawesi can be divided into three stages with Muslims
attacking Christians first, and then Christians attacking Muslims, and finally with
Muslims attacking Christians again. It is a very dangerous process in the
relationship between adversaries which make both sides take a step up the
escalation ladder unintentionally; the conflict has escalated to a higher level
implicitly than either side believed was appropriate for the original subject of
their quarrel.

As the conflicts go on, there will also be an internal change to the
adversaries in the conflicts through the Social-Psychological process and the
Organizational Development. The effect of cognitive dissonance theory and
entrapment were present in the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi, and the
involvement of LJ even fostered these effects. This is because the use of term
“jihad” acts as a good reason for justification for the violence that they have
practiced; the religious values not only justify the harmful acts but also trap the
combatants into a continuing struggle. Hence Thalib announced that anyone who
died fighting Kafir harbi would become a martyr. He remarked:
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“We founded this movement in order to support Muslims in
eastern Indonesia. They were slaughtered by the thousands in Maluku.
The government did nothing to defend the Muslims. Subsequent
governments did not defend them from Christian attacks. In light of
this situation, we had no choice but to found the Laskar Jihad
organization, to protect our Muslim brother in eastern Indonesia.”
(Abuza, 2003, p.70)

The above quotation also reflects the hard-line leadership of the LJ in which
it will make an internal change in the Muslim side in the conflicts since
organizational development is one of the factor in governing the internal change
of the adversaries. Leadership identification with external conflict is one of the
elements in shaping the organizational development, so, with a hard-line
perspective in the leadership level, the organization tends to become so entrapped
as the costs for them to admit that what they are doing now is a failure is s o high
(as they have publicly claimed the course of action undertaken to be the correct
one).

In addition, the poor performance of the Jakarta government in dealing with
the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi also acts as an external factor
which fosters the process of escalation. The central government failed to
effectively respond first of all to the minor incidents, and then to increasingly
large-scale attacks, allowing the cycle of retribution to escalate out of control.
The lose of faith in the security forces of the government also provided a gap for
the presence of LJ as an instrument to ensure the security of the Muslims.

Both the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi entered the stage of
De-escalation due to the government intervention. The inc rease in security forces
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presence in Sulawesi , and the arrest of leaders of LJ and FKM, brought internal
change to the two side, so that they did not have enough ability to sustain
resistance in the conflicts. After that, the communal conflicts in Maluku and
Sulawesi reached the final stage of a conflict, Termination. The conflict in
Maluku seems to have come to an end and the consequence for the conflict in
Sulawesi was the Malino Declaration. As stated before, since the communal
conflicts in these two areas were not a prolonged conflict, the conflict cycle
model will be more appropriate in illustrate the findings. However, the
consequence at this moment may become the Base for a new conflict cycle later
on subject to any internal or external change for the adversaries or the context
behind them. Therefore, the communal conflicts may have a chance to become
conflict spiral in the future.

Generally speaking, the means or the strategies that have been used by the
two sides in the conflicts were full of coercive elements, particularly at the later
stage of the conflicts. So, why is there a greater tendency for the adversaries in
adopt a more coercive mode of strategy?

For the cases in Maluku and Sulawesi, the goals of the contending parties,
the resources of the adversaries, the social context behind the conflict and the
partisan characteristics all contribute in shaping out the strategy that the
adversaries will adopt.

First of all, as stated in chapter five, “the greater the perceived
incompatibility of the goals in a … conflict, the greater the tendency for the
adversaries to choose conflict modes with major coercive and even violent
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components”. (Kriesberg, 1998, p.125). Moreover, as suggested by Louis
Kriesberg, “Goals for members as an entity are more likely to seem to require
coercion than are goals for individual constituent members (Kriesberg, 1998,
p.125). For the cases in Maluku and Sulawesi, with the presence of LJ on the
Muslim side, the goals became highly incompatible with the Christian sides; and
the goals seems as an entity for all the Muslims after the mobilization by LJ of a
“jihad” for the conflicts. For the resources, much evidence shows that LJ had
received support from military and police, for example, the International Crisis
Group notes that the “conclusion is unavoidable that the LJ received the backing
of elements in the military and police. It was obviously military officers who
provided them with military training… ” (Human Right Watch, 2002 p.10). Some
evidence even shows that LJ had received support from Al-Qaeda economically,
but later on, Thalib had refused it. With the involvement of LJ, the Muslim sides
in the conflicts had been increased in strength in terms of the number of fighters
and weapons, which allows them to adopt a more coercive strategy. For the
social context behind the conflicts, there is a change in the norms and prevailing
ways of thinking for the adversaries due to the events of the September 11
incident. It breaks the traditional way of thinking and constraints against
adopting conflict strategy; which provided a new perspective for the adversaries.
The conventional understanding that acts as a barrier in conflict may crossed,
inducing a much more coercive strategy in the conflict.

Finally, for the partisan characteristics, as suggested by Louis Kriesberg,
group ideology drives and channels conflict behavior in many conflicts, thus it is
a crucial component in partisan characteristics. (Kriesberg, 1998, pp.126-133). In
the cases of Malaku and Sulawesi, it is clear that the communal conflicts had
118

Chapter 6

included some elements of religions; it became more explicit after the
involvement of LJ. Religions usually provide a vision of how individuals and
communities should treat each other, including when they are in conflict; it is a
kind of group ideology provided by a religions to its followers. However, more
important is that the ideology also provided a justification for the use of violence;
that means the religious beliefs have the ability to justify the use of force. As one
of the world religions, Islam can have such an ability. With the presence of LJ in
the conflicts, the group’s ideology was consolidated, and that reinforced the
effect of entrapment and cognitive dissonance. It is because they can now
rationalize the practise of injuring and killing others; it will induce a more violent
strategy for achieving the goals in the conflicts since the adversaries find a
‘reason’ for explaining what they are doing now.

To sum up, the above factors have contributed to a more coercive mode of
strategy in the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi. Is terrorism, as a kind of
coercive strategy, being adopted by the adversaries in the communal conflicts? I
will leave this question to the end of this chapter so as to have a discussion
together with the case of JI at the same time.

The case of Jemaah Islamiyah

JI was founded around 1993 to 1994 by the Arab-Indonesian preachers,
Abdullah Sungkar and Abubakar Baasyir with the aim of establishing a Muslim
fundamentalist state in the Southeast Asia region, which included Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, Southern Thailand and even Indonesia. Baayir
took over leadership of the organization following Sungkar’s death in 1999.
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Estimates of the organization’s current membership vary from 500 to several
thousands (Abuza, 2003 pp.125-171). The origins of the JI network are found in
Indonesia, dating back to the 1960s. The group has its roots in Darul Islam, a
violent radical movement that advocated the establishment of Islamic law in
Indonesia. The two founders of JI, Sungkar and Baasyir, considered themselves
the ideological heirs of Sekarmadji Maridijan Kartosuwirjo (the founder of the
Darul Islam). With such a strong ideology in mind, they set up Islamic boarding
school in Solo in 1972 with the aim of spreading a hard-line Islamism. Baasyir
and Sungkar were arrested by the Suharto regime in November 1978 and they
were sentenced to nine years for violating a 1963 subversion law; the two were
released in 1982 10.

The massacre of Muslims protestors by the army in Tanjong Priok in
September 1984 was seen by Baasyir as a declaration of war against Muslims, so
he stepped up his attacks of the New Order government with a series of
bombings in 1984 to 1985. However, due to the judgment of Supreme Court in
1985, Baasyir and Sungjar immediately fled to Malaysia. (Abuza, 2003,
pp.125-128)

During the mid -1980s to early 1990s, Sungkar and Baasyir were trying to
consolidate their thinking and began to establish their networks with other radical
groups, for example Al-Qaeda (please refer to chapter four). At that period,
Sungkar confirmed that a violent jihad was needed in order to create an Islamic
state. In addition, he contended that the Islamic community had to build up three
strengths which are faith’s strength (Quwwatal aqidah); brotherhood’s strength
(Quwwatal Vkhuwwah) and military strength (Quwwatal Mashallah). Generally
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speaking, it was a period of consolidation for JI, which was to have a great
impact on the organization later. (Abuza, 2003, pp.125-128)

As stated before, although JI was established around 1993-94, it did not
conduct its first terrorist acts until 2000. During this period, JI was in the stage of
building up its network through recruiting, training, and strengthening technical
profic iency. It is clear that the leaders of JI had a long-sighted view of sustaining
the JI over time. The JI began to have a formal structure, with Sungkar and
Baasyir serving as the group’s amirs (spirtual) leaders, under whom there were
four cells which covered different countries in the Southeast Asian region11. The
fall of Suharto in 1998 provided a great opportunity for the expansion of JI. Just
like hundreds of radical Muslim exiles, Sungkar and Baasyir could now return to
Indonesia and demand political space. According to Abaza, “Sungkar and
Baasyir threw themselves into the new political environment, feverishly working
to build up a constituency of individuals committed to turning the post-New
Order government into a true Islamic State” (Abuza, 2003, p141). In mid-2000,
Baaysir even established the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (MMI), an
organization which serves as an umbrella organization and coordinating body for
many militant and hard-line Islamic organizations groups who are committed to
the establishment of an Islamic state. The goal for JI become more explicit at this
moment as Baasyir said that “the long term strategy is to get Indonesia 100
percent based on Sharia. As long as Muslims are the majority, the country should
be rule by Sharia” (Abuza, 2003, p142).

With developments in both the ideology, goals and network in the previous
decade, the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi in the late 1990s acted
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as a turning point in the JI’s operations. The poor performance of the central
government on this issue served to embolden the members of JI to act more
violently in the future. Moreover, the jihads in these areas also act as a sample for
JI and let them gain experience. Therefore, after years of planning, training and
even gaining confidence in communal conflicts, JI carried out a series of
operations by the beginning of 2000. In December 2000, a wave of church
bombings in Indonesia that killed 18 peoples. Asian and US officials say
Hambali had a hand in these attacks. In August 2000, the Philippine ambassador
to Indonesia was the target of a bombing. The attack was conducted by
Indonesian JI operatives. In October 2002, the JI carried out the Bali bombing
which would leave 202 people dead (for details, see chapter four). This tragedy
produced pressures both internally and externally for the Megawati’s
administration. The government finally arrested Baasyir and some suspects in the
bombing; three were sentenced to death, one was sentenced to life in jail and
Baasyir was sentenced to four years in prison for treason and immigration
violations. In addition, between 9, December 2001, and June 2003, a number of
JI’s senior leaders and members were arrested12. At this moment, the capability
of JI had been deeply affected

However, the trials of the JI leader, Baasyir and the Bali bombers are likely
to provoke a strong reaction from JI against the secular side. The car bombing of
the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta on August 2003 was a good example.

The application of conflict cycle model

It is clear that for the case of JI was certainly a conflict between the secular
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side with the aim on a united country, that basically is the central government,
and the JI. The two sides have an incompatible goal, for the Jakarta government
wants to maintain Indonesia as a united and secular country; however, for JI, they
want to establish an Islamic State in Southeast Asia with Indonesia as part of that
Islamic state. Therefore, it is a conflict between two sides with an incompatible
goal. Conflict cycle model can be use in analyzing the case of JI. Since the case
of JI is a prolonged conflict with the roots at round 1960s, so conflict spiral
model will be more appropriate for this case.

The Base for this conflict was rooted at the Darul Islam movement, in other
wor ds, the underlying conditions for this conflict come from the different views
towards the nature of Indonesia. Some people think that it should be in the form
as a unitary state with secular rule; while some may think that it should be a
Islamic state encompassing other Islamic areas. These different views become
the source for an a overt struggle later on.

The conflict became manifest after the massacre in Tanjung Priok in
September 1974. From that moment, Baasyir, the spiral leader of JI in the the
future began to believe that the Muslim side were suffering grievances and that
he should try to bring about changes to other side in order to reduce their
grievances. The massacre fostered these underlying conditions in the base change
and became more conducive to the eruption of a struggle.

The conflict entered the stage of escalation with a series of bombings which
were allegedly encouraged by Baasyir in 1984 to 1985. The conflict has said to
be escalated since there was a increase in the severity of coercive inducement
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used in the conflict. The conflict soon moved on to the stage of de -escalation
after Baasyir and Sungkar had fled to Malaysia in 1985, and then it had entered
the stage of termination.

The end of the first sweep of the conflict became the base for the second
sweep in the conflict spiral. The suppression by the central government of Sunkar
and Baasyir at the first sweep even helped to consolidate their goal of creating an
Islamic State and against the central government. Sungkar stated in a 1997
interview:

Suharto, using force, makes it compulsory for the Islamic
community to accept Pancasila as the only foundation for the nation,
political parties and organizations… his regime still applies the
system ”detect, defect and destroy” when applied towards the Islamic
movement which it distrusts and regards as subversive.

The conflict was again in the stage of escalation during the period from the
late 1990s to late 2002. During this period, there was an increase in the scope of
participation in the conflict since JI began to develop both in terms of resources
and organizational institutions. Such an internal development provided the
foundation for the use of more coercive conflict strategies in the future. In
addition, the fall of Suharto in 1998 also acted as an external influence at the
stage of escalation. It is because the fall of Suharto provided a change in relations
between the adversaries and the leaders of JI have a chance to go back to
Indonesia. There was an increase in the severity of inducements used in the
conflict, particularly 2000-2002, such as the bombing on churches. The
escalation came to its height with the Bali bombing in 2002.
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Due to the pressures from the internal and external side, the central
government took action against JI by arresting Baasyir and other senior leaders
and members of JI. The conflict soon moved on to the stage of de -escalation
since the JI did not have enough ability to sustain its resistance to the Indonesia
government. Then, the conflict reached the final stage, Termination. Up to now, it
seems as if the conflict between the central government and JI has come to an
end. However, the car bombing in J.W. Marriot hotel in 2003 shown that a new
conflict sweep may possibly emerge as some of the JI members may not happy
with the result in the second sweep, which was the arrest of Baasyir. The end of
the second sweep of conflict may become the case for a new sweep.

The conflict spiral model serve well in guiding the findings on the case of JI;
from the analysis right before, we can see that there was an increase in the
coercive elements in the conflict, particularly for the Bali bombing. A question
arises as to why JI chose to adopt conflict strategies with violence? Just as in the
case of LJ, the four factors governing the adaptation of different strategies by the
adversaries were: goals of adversaries; resources of adversaries; social context
behind the conflict and partisan characteristics.

First of all, it is clear that the goal for JI and the Jakarta government is
incompatible, therefore, there will be a greater tendency for the adversaries to
choose a conflict strategy with major coercive and even violent components.
Second, resources is a crucial factor in determining which strategy can be adopt.
With its development during the late 1990s to early 2000, JI had enough ability
in practicing conflict strategies with more coercive elements. For the social
context behind the conflict, the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi did
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break the norms and prevailing ways of thinking to JI, giving confidence to them
in practicing a more violent strategy due to the equivocation performance by the
Indonesian government on the communal conflicts. Finally, JI provided a strong
and consolidated ideology to the members who can use it as a justification for the
violent acts. The ability to justify or rationalize the coercive elements in the
conflict will reinforce the effect of cognitive dissonance and entrapment, which
will foster or intensify the process of escalation in a conflict by making internal
changes to one side. This can been seen from the interviews with Amrozi and
Imam Samndra, the accused bombers in the Bali incident.

When investigators asker Amrozi why he wanted to bomb the Sari
Club he repeated told the m he hated Americans. Similary, Imam
Samuudra made it clear that his main target was the U.S. He said: ‘I
hated America because it is the real center of international terrorism,
which has already repeatedly tyrannized Islam’. ‘I carry out jihad’, he
declared, ‘because it’s the duty of a Muslim to avenge, so [that] the
American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of
Muslim community is not shed for nothing’. He went on to say that he
had chosen the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar as targets because he knew
they were ‘often visited by Americans and even Mossad pepople’.
(Fealy, 2003)

From the above dialogue, it is clear that the effect of cognitive dissonance
and entrapment was reinforced by the strong religious ideology. It imparted a
powerful sense of mission and purpose to the adversaries in the conflict, which
induce them to take part in more violent activities .It is because they just see
themselves as fighting a heroic war against evil, but not committing violent acts.

Existence of Terrorism in the Ideological Challenge
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So, up to now, we know that for both the cases of LJ and JI, despite the
difference in aims, they are conflicts with coercive elements inside it. The
question here is does terrorism, a kind of coercive conflict strategy, exist in the
ideological challenge by Islam in Indonesia?

For the case of LJ, it seems that the communal conflict in Maluku and
Sulawesi was just a civil war. However, I would argue that it is a conflict with
terrorism, because the means and tactics used by both sides can fulfill the six
elements of terrorism which have been mentioned in chapter one. The two sides
in the conflict, the Muslims and the Christians try to create and instil fear to the
opposite group through violent means, such as massacre and burning villages.
These practices can instil fear to the “target audience” in the hope of expelling
the other side from Maluku and Sulawesi. It is clear that the communal conflicts
had induced the mechanism of terrorism (see chapter one ). Moreover, it was not
a civil war because the scale was not as large as a war. In principle, war is subject
to rules of international law; while terrorist recognize no rules.

For the case of JI, it is clear that its practice and networking was a kind of
New Terrorism in terms of the nature of the group, the level of lethality and the
practice of not claiming credit for the attacks (see chapter one).

Both the cases for LJ and JI demonstrated that terrorism perpetrated for
religious motives is far more lethal. Take the examples in Maluku and Sulawesi,
after the involvement of LJ, which reinforced the element of religious motives.
The conflicts thus became intensified in terms of the level of violence. The
reason behind it is the different value system, concept of morality, mechanism of
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legitimization and justification provided by religio ns. A good example is the
dualism of Baasyir, who viewed the world as divided in two:

Allah has divided humanity into two segments, namely the followers of
Allah and those who follow Satan… God’s group are those who follow
Islam, those who are prepared to follow his laws and struggle for the
implementation of Sharia, that is [Hisbullah]. Meanwhile what is meant by
Satan’s group is humanity which oppose Allah’s law, humanity which
wishes to bring pressure to bear upon Allah’s law, and wishes to throw
obstacles in the path of the implementation of Allah’s law…
Because the character of followers of Satan is always opposing Allah…
there is no non-believer who allows the development of Islam, who will
allow Islam to be free; non-believer must work hard to threaten Islam and
laws thereof. This is the character of non-believers. Non-believers will
always expend their wealth to impede the way of God, to impede the law of
Islam. Non-believers will expend not insignificant sums to destroy Islam.
This is the character of non-believers (Abuza, 2003, p.127)

With such a different perception among themselves (the members of LJ and
JI) and their violent acts, they see themselves as “outsiders” of the existing
system, and seeking fundamental changes in the existing order. This is quite
different from those terrorists who are not inspired by religions, and who regard
violence either as “a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is
basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system.” (Hoffman,
1998, p.95) This can help to explain why terrorists with religious motivation are
more unconstrained than those who only have a secular mind. As Hoffman stated
“This sense of alienation also enables the religious terrorists to contemplate far
more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular terrorists,
and indeed to embrace a far more open-ended category of “enemies” for attack”
(Hoffman, 1998, p.95) . Also, religious martyrdom increate the ferocity of the
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attacks.

Therefore, with the above reasons, it will be not hard to understand why the
ideological challenge by Islam in Indonesia has induced terrorism as the strategy
in the conflicts. Indeed, such a security threat is quite difficult for the Jakarta
government in tackling it due to the internal constraints within the country itself
and the constraints on dealing with terrorism.

How difficult to tackle

For the internal constraints, due to the political instability of the
post-Suharto period and aware of the Muslim influence in politics, the central
government held a regressive attitude towards the ideological challenge by Islam.
Their approach to the conflict is just to try to keep large -scale violence from
flaring up again, but not to assess to the fundamental factor(s) behind the conflict.
Such a rationale has induced a poor performance by the government and the
security forces in handling the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi and
provided a chance for the involvement of LJ, which in return acted as the main
factor in escalating the conflicts. In addition, the security forces also contribute d
to intensifying the conflicts since they have sold weapons to LJ and allow LJ
militiamen traveling from Java to Maluku and Sulawesi (Huxley, 2002, p.60).
Abuza also stated that “There is evidence that the military allowed this to happen
to discredit the civilian government that has tried to politically emasculate the
military… Clearly the LJ benefited from the domestic political situation and the
contest of wills between president Wahid and the military” (Abuza, 2003,
pp.71-72).
129

Chapter 6

For the constraints on dealing with terrorism, due to the change in the nature
of terrorist groups and the easier means to assess the terrorist tactics and means,
more “amateur s” had been involved in terrorist acts. This makes it hard for the
government to recognize the targets that they needed to deal with, so making it
more difficult to track and anticipate. Moreover, the less defined set of political,
social and economic objectives for the terrorist groups, which are motivated by a
religious imperative, together with the transnational cooperation among the
terrorist groups are creating a far more amorphous and diffuse context than
before. In the face of such a complicated situation, to which should be added the
internal difficulties of the country itself, it is believed that the central government
will find it hard in dealing with the threat from the Islamic ideological challenge
linked w ith terrorism.

Conclusion

To conclude, the ideological challenge by Islam may be much more
dangerous than the secessionist threat to the national security of Indonesia. It is
because religions will provide a strong sense of ideology in the conflict which
will make the situation become more complicated. The adversaries in the conflict
can justify the violent acts that they are undertaking as a divine duty executed in
direct response to some theological demand or imperative. The traditional
constraints, such as political, moral or practical constraints on other adversaries
may not be a constraint anymore to the adversaries with a religious background.
More coercive elements will be appearing during the conflicts.
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Notes

1

Jaafar is the grandson of a Yemeni trader who settled in East Java. In 1986, he traveled to
Pakistan for Islamic studies and attended a training camp. When the Soviets left Afghanistan in
1989, Jaafar returned to Java.
2
According to Thalib, jihad “does not mean war. In the Quran there are 13 types of jihad.
Sometimes it means peaceful struggle. Sometimes it means doing good works. Sometimes it
means a fight against Santa, and sometimes it means against infields. ” When asked which type of
jihad it was in the Malukus, he answered, “All 13 at once.”
3
During the Dutch colonial period, Christians were the majority in Maluku ’s population.
4
The conflict in North Maluku was broke out in August 1999, after plans were announced for a
new administrative district in northern Halmahera, populated by Muslim migrants from the island
of Makian and including a newly-opened gold mine. T he clash occurred against the backdrop of
North Maluku’s imminent separation to form a new province, and plans for provincial elections
in June 2000.
5
An organization established by Maluku Protestant leaders in mid-2000, which demanded
independence for Ambon and surrounding islands.
6
The eight villages are: Betalemba, Patiwunga, Deuwa, Sanginora, Tangkura, Padalembara,
Silanca, and Sepe.
7
They were well equipped, for example, with AK-47s, grenade and rocket launchers, bulldozers,
and tanker trucks.
8
It was organized by the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Yudhoyono
and Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, Yusuf Kalla.
9

T he ten-point of Malino Declaration:
1) To cease all forms of conflict and dispute.
2) To obey efforts to enforce the law and support legal sanctions against lawbreakers.
3) To ask the state apparatus to act firmly and justly to maintain security.
4) In order to create a condition of peace, to reject the imposition of a state of emergency and
any foreign party involvement.
5) To dismiss slander and dishonesty against all parties and enforce an attitude of mutual
respect, and to forgive for the sake of peaceful coexistence.
6) Poso is an integral part of Indonesia. Therefore every citizen has the right to live, come and
stay peacefully and respectfully of local customs.
7) All rights and belongings have to be returned to their lawful owners as they were before the
conflict began.
8) To return all displaced people to their respective homes.
9) Together with the government, to carry out complete rehabilitation of the economic
infrastructure.
10) To carry out respective religious laws according to a principle of mutual respect and to
abide by all the agreed upon rules, in the form of laws, government regulations, or other
regulations.
10
A second court upheld the conviction but lessened the sentence to four years. But in 1985, the
supreme court overturned the appeals court’s conviction and reimposed the original nine years
sentence.
11
Cell (mantiqi) 1 covered peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, and southern Thailand.
Cell (mantiqi) 2 covered Indonesia.
Cell (mantiqi) 3 covered the Philippines, Brunei, eastern Malaysia, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.
Cell (mantiqi) 4 was being developed to establish cells in Australia and Irian Jaya (Papua).
12
There were roughly eighty in Malaysia, thirty one in Singapore, nearly fifty in Indonesia, and a
dozen in Philippines.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion

Is terrorism becoming a new threat to Indonesia? Probably, it will be the most
crucial question in this thesis. However, in exploring this question, more questions
on the national security of Indonesia have emerged at the same time. In this
concluding chapter, we will come across the research questions of this thesis first,
which may act as a summary; then, the question on whether terrorism becomes a new
threat to Indonesia will be answered. Finally, can we obtain any implication or
inspiration from this study?

In chapter three, the nature of the key security threats has been identified as the
secessionist threat and the ideological challenge by Islam (Research Question 1)

Referring to Research Question 2, the nature of the security threats has changed
due to the change in political environment. Security threats during the Sukarno and
Suharto period had included with the ideological challenge from communism.
However, due to the change in international political context, this threat had
evaporated. Moreover, for those threats which already existed in the Sukarno and
Suharto period, because of the stepping down of Suharto, they seemed to become
more intensified than before. The fall of Suharto did made changes in the political
environment. A more released political atmosphere allowed the increasing presence
of the Islamic organizations in politics; and the favored instrument in dealing with
the secessionist threats --- special autonomy seems not work any more. In addition,
with the fall of Suharto, the military side has changed, for the differences between
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the civilian government and the TNI has been increased. Central government finds it
hard in controlling the TNI side. Beside the change in the political environment, the
economic background (particularly the 1998 economic collapse) also acts as a factor
the change in the nature of the security threats.

After dealing with the Research Questions which are concerned with the
security side, we now move on to examine the questions that focusing on terrorism.

Terrorism in this thesis has been divided into two types, ‘traditional’ terrorism
and New Terrorism (refer to chapter one). Generally speaking, ‘traditional’ terrorism
had already existed in the secessionist movements and the ide ological challenge by
Islam. These security threats were a kind of conflict, and ‘traditional’ terrorism act as
a conflict strategy in achieving the goal(s) (refer to chapter five and six).

Due to the change in the world context together with the internal change within
Indonesia itself, ‘traditional’ terrorism which had been existed in the security threats
before seems to have transformed into New Terrorism. The Bali and J.W. Marriott
Hotel Bombing were the watershed between the ‘traditional’ terrorism and New
terrorism in Indonesia.

The increasing level of lethality in the terrorism attacks, the practice of not
claiming for immediate responsibility by the terrorist groups after the attacks, the
transnational cooperation and infiltration of Al-Qaeda since the late 1980s, and the
more obscure millenarian goals and goal(s) with religious imperative were all good
indicators to demonstrate the transformation of ‘traditional’ terrorism to New
Terrorism to Indonesia.
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As mentioned before, terrorism is a kind of conflict strategy that was adopted by
the secessionists and the radical religious groups as a means for achieving their
aim(s). Therefore, there is a difference between tackling the security threats and
terrorism, since the first one is the subject itself and the second one is the mean to
achieve the subject.

The limitation on or difficulties for the Indonesian government in tackling the
security threats was due to the political instability after the fall of Suharto. There
were many constraints on the successors of Suharto, such as the increasing influence
of the Islamic side, the influence from the TNI and the external influence from other
countries or forces. These kinds of constraints limited the choice and freedom for the
central administration to adopting their policy since the government need to keep a
balance among different sides. The response to the September 11 incident by
Megawati’s government was a good example in illustrating how the pressure from
internal and external side affected the decision making of the central government
(refer to chapter four). Because of such a political instability in the central
administration, the government has not had a consistent planning on strategy in
handling the security threats. In addition, the TNI also acted as an instable factor to
the security threats since some evidence has shown that TNI was involved in the
secessionist movements in Aceh and the communal conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi
(refer to chapter five and six).

The limitations and difficulties in tackling terrorism, or more specifically, the
New Terrorism by the Indonesian government was basically due to the difficulties in
recognizing the target. The obscure goals among the terrorists or terrorist groups, the
less cohesive structure of the ter rorist groups, the presence of more ‘amateur’
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terrorists with fewer constraints from the central command authority were all factors
that have made it difficult for the government to track and anticipate the terrorist acts.
Since everyone may have a chance to become a terrorist, it will be difficult for the
government to just find a target and hit. With the globalization and the increase in
telecommunications and information flow, more and more people may have a chance
to access the skills on terrorist acts, such as making bombs. This means there is a
higher probability for anyone to be a terrorist. The government will not have enough
ability in tackling this.

In addition, the geographical features of Indonesia --- a vast archipelago make it
a potential heaven for the transnational cooperation and infiltration among terrorist
groups, since such vast and separated boundaries increase the difficulty for the
government to search for and hit terrorists.

In answering the question “Is terrorism a recent threat for Indonesia?” I would
say “no”, since Indonesia had been faced with the threat from “traditional” terrorism
already. However, if the question becomes more specific, let say, “Is New Terrorism
becomes a new threat for Indonesia?” Then, the answer will become “yes, it is a new
threat for Indonesia.”

Basically, terrorism in Indonesia is now in the process of transformation from
the “traditional” one towards the New Terrorism due to the change in international as
well as domestic context. New terrorism contains some new features which make it
more difficult to tackle than the “traditional” one (for example the use of Weapon of
Mass Destruction). Therefore, the traditional way in dealing with terrorism may not
be work now, thus, in facing with New Terrorism, Indonesia is facing a new threat
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which has not existed before. Actually, there is not a clear cut or distinction between
“traditional” terrorism and New Terrorism. The “New” one is building on the
“traditional” one, with some modifications fine -tuning on it due to the change in the
context. Therefore, as the domestic context of Indonesia has changed (such as the
liberalization of political atmosphere after the fall of Suharto) together with the
change in international context (such as globalization), the “tr aditional” terrorism
that was adopted by the secessionists and radical religious groups will also transform
to New Terrorism. Acting as a new threat to Indonesia’s national security.

Throughout the whole thesis, conflict cycle and conflict spiral model has been
used as a guiding on findings. They were good at illustrating the “life” of a conflict.
It is valuable and important for us to have some knowledge on conflict because
terrorism is just a mean or strategy in the conflict, the fundamental or basis for
terrorism is the conflict itself. So, if we can stop the emergence of a conflict, then
terrorism will not exist too.

Moreover, it can also help in demonstrate that terrorism act as the last and the
most

violence

strategy

for

the

adversaries

(secessionists

and

radical

Muslims/Christians) to achieve their goals. Three factors will generate the adoption
of the strategy as suggested by the model. They are goals, resources and social
context of the adversaries. All the cases (both the secessionist case, the communal
conflicts as well as the case for JI) in this thesis shows that the conflict strategy
adopted by the adversaries at first were in small scale and less violent form, however,
as the process of escalation goes on; together with the change in the factors
mentioned

above,

for

example,

the

social

psychological

process

will

re-assure/re-enforce the goals of each sides in a conflict. Making it much more
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difficult for both sides to settle down peacefully. This will, however, induce them to
adopt a more lethal strategy in order to achieve the goals.

It seems that the analysis with conflict cycle and conflict spiral model in chapter
five and six is quite pessimistic, because once the conflict has started (security
threats) it will never end. However, we can still lessen the situation by stopping the
moving of the conflict one stage to another stage in the conflict cycle. Even if there
are underlying conditions, at the stage of Base, a conflict would not emerge if it has
not reach the Manifestation stage. Similarly, even if it has reached the stage
Manifestation, the destruction of a conflict can still be managed by presenting it from
reaching the Escalation stage. As Kriesberg stated that “We may not escape them
(conflicts) all, but we can certainly reduce them and limit them” (Kriesberg, 1998,
p.371). To be more concrete, if the Indonesian government really wants to mange
those conflicts (security threats) in the country, they should pay more attention to the
handling of the grievances of the contending groups. If they have not created a sense
of grievance among themselves, the conflict will be less easy to become manifest.
The Jakarta government can do it through establishing a formal and consistent rather
than spasmodic and chaotic conflict resolution mechanism or institutions, such as
negotiation or a official department which is specific ally for dealing with the related
conflict. Moreover, the central government should deal with the conflicts
immediately and so prevent them to become a prolonged conflict. If conflicts cannot
be settle down in a short term, the process of escalation will be intensified, more
violent elements will be included, thus, turning the conflict into a more destructive
way which is more difficult to manage.

To conclude, there is an inter-relationship between national security, security
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threats and terrorism. Given that terrorism is a strategy in the security threats
(conflicts), then those threats will affect the national security of Indonesia. In the
course of doing this research, my studies have induced me into some rethinking
about the country of Indonesia. First, the transmigration programme practiced by the
Jakarta government during the Suharto period can be considered as a structural and
divisive cause of terrorism -both “traditional” and New Terrorism. In such a way a
wrong policy by “elites” may create a deep impact on many humans which is far
outside their expectations. Second, the original fluidity of Indonesia which Sukarno
and Suharto did much to freeze is now thawing. Indonesia's national identity is in
question by millions of its citizens. Indonesia is now at the crossroads, and it seems
that no one can change this situation in the near future.
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